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ABSTRACT 
,/ 
This paper develops· a sequential dynamic general equilibrium modeVof the U.S. economy • 
/ 
DAGEM. Economic behavior of .eyer~ agent in thi~ economy is derived from an intertemporal 
specification of the agent's objectives and constraints. Firms maximize the present value of the net 
cash flow.in a technology with adjustment costs to deterrT}in~ endogenously optimal supplies and 
, 
.optimal demands for the different production inputs. In particular, investment decisions are 
,I 
forward looking. Real investment is financed by retained earnings and issuance of new debt and i 
equity according to exog~nousJy defined rules. Government intertemporal behavior is obtained 
from the maximization of a social welfare function defined over the domain of a public good and 
subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. The government is allowed to run deficits which are 
financed by issuing bonds. Optimal household behavior follow$ a life-cycle type of model 
generating endogenous savings and labor-leisure decisions. Household asset portfolio decisions 
merely accommodate the composition of demand for funds. Equil1brium in this "economy is 
conceived as a temporary Walrasian equilibrium. All the markets clear, hence the Walrasian 
1 
nature of equilibrium~ Also, equilibrium in the short run is such thaf market clearing prices' are 
parametric on the, expectation formation rules, hence the ternporary 'na~ura of equilib'rium. 
. The 'second part of this paper addresses probleR1s of implementation and policy analysis with 
the DAGEM. In the context of applied general equilibrium analysis, policy "evaluations are typically 
. . 
carried out by contrasting a base case reflecting the status quo aod several counterfactual equiHbria 
reflecting different scenarios generated by the policy chang,e under consideration. First, it is 
. ' 
necessary to specify the base case equilibrium. I~ particular, the data require ..ments are reviewed 
and sources provided. Secondly, the different equilibria are made comparable by the use of the 
concept of equal yield. 'The concept of equal yield is generalized to accommodate the existence of 
government deficits. Thirdly, the infor~ation contained in the different equiDbria is synthesized 
~y using a scalar indicator. This indicator is the dyncrnic gener~Jrzation of the Hicksian 
compensation tests to a context in, whicr expe~tations are not self-fulfilling, and no future markets 
exist. This chapter contains also a discussion of the computation strategy and, in particular, the 
computation algorithm. 
This paper concludes with a critical assessment of the DAGEM in terms of modeling and 
imp1ementation as well as suggestions for f,utur~ research. The potential of the methodology 
developed in this paper ip emphasized. In particular, the merits of DAGEM to address several 
public finance issues, like the possible re-introduction of investment tax credits or the effects of 
political measures tending to balance the government budget, are discussed. 
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DAGEM - A DYNAMIC APPLIED GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
FOR TAX POLICY EVALUATION'"' 
Documentation 
CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
There is a well established body of literature focusing on tax policy evaluation using 
computational general equilibrium (CGE) techniques (seQ Shoven-Whalley (1984) and Pereira­
Shoven (1988) for detailed surveys of this literature).1/ The CGE approach has been developed as 
an answer to the three-way trade-off among the traditional methodologies in economics in their 
quest for comparative statics results. Partial equilibrium allows for highly disaggregated analysis 
at the cost of not conSidering market interactions. Macroeconomics allows--10r market interactions 
. . / 
, ,I 
tn the context of highly aggregated, models. In turn, analytic general equilibrium allows for both 

disaggregated analysis and full consideration of market interactions. However, unlike partial 

. equilibrium and macroeconomic -analysis, general equilibrium fails, in general, to produce 

clear-cut quantitative and qualitative analytic comparative statics results. This is due to the 

complexity and dimensionality added to afford full-market feedbacks in a disaggregated setting. 
Computational general equilib-ium keeps th~ desirable features of /analytic general 
equilibrium. In particular, it allows the study ~f differential impacts across sectors of production 
and consumer groups taking into full consideration market interactions. However, CGE is based on 
the use of flexible numeric - as opposed to analytiC - techniques to obtain clear unambiguous 
comparative statics results. Furthermore, by adopting the numeric approach, the moaeler does not 
have to be confined to small changes in parameters as with an analytiC .approach. Th.is is also an 
important feature because large changes in policy parameters are required by most policy 
alternatives. 
This paper develops a dynamic applied general equilibrium model for tax policy evaluation ­
2 

DAGEM. The economy is characterized by an incomplete, sequential market structure in a finite' 
horizon and in a discrete time frame. Agents face a dynamic environment. Economic behavior of 
every agent in this economy is derived from an. intertemporal specification of the agent's objectives 
-and constraints. Firms maximize the present value of the net cash flow in a technology with 
adjustment costs to determine endogenously optimal ~uppli~s and op!imal demands for the di,fferent 
production inputs. In particular, investment decisio.ns are forwar:d lookin'g. Real investment is 
financed by retpined earnings and issuance of new debt and equity according to exogenously defined 
rules. Government intertemporal behavior is obtained fro'm the maximization of asocial welfare 
function defined over the domain of a public good and subject to an intertemporal budget constraint. 
'The government is allowed to run deficits which are financed by issuing bonds. Optimal household 
behavior follows a life-cycle type of model generating endogenous savings and labor-leisure 
, ~ 

/ 

decisions. Household asset portfolio decisions merely accommodate to the 'composition of demand 
/ 
for funds. 
Economic decisions are formulated in a context of uncertainty about future priQes and interest 
rates, In ~ach period, expectations 'are formed as point eXp'e~tations according to given rules. The 
.concept of Temporary Walrasian Equilibrium (TWE) is adopted to capture the incomplete and 
sequential aspects of real world trading and the limitations of foresight into the future. All the 
markets for the several consumption goods, investment goods, labor, and financial funds, clear, 
henqe the Walrasian nature of equilibrium. Also, equilibrium in the short run is such that market 
clearing prices are parametriC on the expectation formation rules, hence the temporary nature of 
equilibrium. 
The model in this paper departs from most of the numerical GE literature for tax policy 
evaluation, in several fundamental directions directly relevant for policy oriented' analysis.2/ 
First, it provides a comprehensive modeling of dynamic economic behavior. In particular, 
- . 
governmentdeficits are optimally determined and investment decisions are forward looking and are 
the result of optimizing behavior. Secondly, it encompasses an endogenous sequential equilibrium 
.. , \ 
3 
structure founded on dynamic economic behavior with flexible expectations'. Thirdly, the "model 
. 
provides a detailed consideration of financial assets, pt:Jblic and privafe. 
In the ,context of applied general equilibrium analysis, policy evaluatians are typically carried 
.out by contrasting a base case reflecting the status q40 ~nd several counterfactual - revised case ­
. 

equilibria reflecting different policy scenarios. That being the case, it is first necessary to specify 

the base-case equilibrium. In particular, the data requirements are .reviewed and sources 

. . 

provided. Secondly, the different equilibria are ':lade comparable by the use of the concept of equal 

yield generalized to accommodate the existence of government deficits. Government optimal 

behavior in the revised cases is consistent with the base case social utility -levels. Tax policy 

changes may be financed by increased tax revenues holding government deficits constant, or by 

Increased debt holding tax revenues constant, or any combination of the two. The pure effects of the 

tax policy change can thereby be separated from the effects induced by margi'nal financial crowding· 

/ 
, / 
out. Third1y f the information contai~ed in the different equilibria is typic'ally synthesized by using 

a· scalar indicator which is the dynamic generalization of the Hicksian compen~ation tests. This 

measure was derived speci'fically. to accommodate intertemporal comparisons when perfect 

. foresight is not assumed and future markets are not open. 
Due to the absence of the requirement of intertemporally consistent action plans, the empirical 
. 
implementation of the DAGEM for a T-oeriod horizon, !mplies that T-separate rounds of one-period 
equilibria have to be computed. The link between adjacent periods is epdogenously provided by the 
recursive relationships of the stock variables in the economy. The DAGEM model is implemented 
with a stylized data set for the U.S. economy, using a nonlinear optimization algorithm - NPSOL. 
This paper concludes with the critical assessment of the different contributions in terms of 

modeling and implementation. Some directions for future research are also discussed, Also, the

. . 

potential of the methodology developed in this paper is emphasized. In particular, the merits of 

DAGEM to address several' public finance issues, such as the reintroduction of investment -tax 

credits, or the 'effects of political measures tending to balance the government budget are discussed . 

... 
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CHAPTER 2 - A DYNAMIC GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL FOB TAX POUCy'EVALUATION 
This chapter opens with a brief ,overview of "non-dynamic" CGE models. The rest of the chapter 
develops a fully dynamic applied general equilibrium model -DAGEM - 'designed for. th~ purpose of 
. . 
tax policy evaluation. Section 2.2 provides a general characterization of the economic environment. 
.. 
The optimal behavior of households, producers, and government is spelled out in sections 2.3-2.5. 
Section 2.6, establishes the temporary Wal~asian equilibrium conQltions and the optimal 
transitions for the different stock variables in the economy. Section 2.!, develops the different 
rules of formation of expectations to be considered in this work. Sections 2.3-2:7, also include 
brief overviews of relevant aspects of dynamic CGE modeling. for tax policy evaruation. 
2.1 B81EF OVE8VIEW Of "NON·DYNAMIC" GENE8AL EQUILlB81UM MODELS
.' 
."" \ 
The origin of most of the CGE models goes back tbthe. work of Scarf (1967, 1973),' who first 
developed. a reliable alg9rithm to compute equilibrium prices for an Arrow-Debreu economy. His 
, 
.algorithm used simplicial subdivision techniques and can be shown to be the computational analog of 
the fixed poinf theorems previously used to prove the existence of equilibrium. His technique could 
sOlve a model with an arbitrary number of consumers and commodities, as long as all agents were 
price takers, consumers were subject to budget constraints, demands were continuous, and 
production did not display increasing returns to scale. The algorithm, while guaranteed to 
converge, was relatively slow for problems involving more than say, 20 dimensions. A major 
improvement in computational speed was offered by Merrill's algorithm (1972), which used the 
same fundamental ideas as Scarf's procedure. 
Scarfs model (as is true for the standard Arrow-Oebreu model) does not include a government 
secto"r - neither taxes nor public goods. As one of fhe m"ost promising applications of the new 
computational technique was in the area of tax policy evaluation, Shoven and Whalley (1973) 
\ 
. .c 
5 
extended the general equilibrium mode!" and computational approach to include a wide. array of taxes 
and a government spending plan. The original Shoven-Whalley model was, static (although the 
'. 
different commodities could be considered ?imilar .goods available at· different dates, as in 
. . 
.Arrow-Debreu), and' government was assumed to run a balanced budget. THe data are arranged as a 
soci.?ll accounting matrix. The model's specification and calibration are checked by solving it in the 
presence of the base set of taxes. The result should be exactly t~e initial ·social ac?ounting matrix. 
After having passed this replication check,' the. model js solved for a counterfactual equilibrium in 
the presence of a new tax design. The result is once again a social accounting matrix. The two 
equilibria are compared in oreer to assess the impact of the new tax plan. The· first uses of this 
model for tax policy evaluation were Shoven-Whalley (1972), Whalley (1975), and Shoven 
(1976). 
Completely static models as Shoven-Whalley's are unsatisfactory for many tax reform issues. 
. . / 
! 
These include corporate tax integration, effects of investment tax credits, effects of accelerated 
depreciatio.ns, consumer or expenditure taxes, and importance ~f saving subsidies like IRA's, etc . 
. These are essentially dynamic issues~ They involve not only the allocation of capital across sectors, 
but perhaps, more importantly, the capital intensity of the economy. But, the capital accumulation 
and capital reallocation take time and may involve adjustment costs. Because" of these issues, 
BalJard-Fulierton-Shoven-Whalley tool: the first steps .towards developing a dynamic model. 
In this context, the Shoven-Whalley model has been extended and implemented for the U.S. 
economy in Bailard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985). While their book completely documents 
the modei, it was used in several publications beginning in 1978. Their model consists of nineteen 
production sectors, twelve households, and fifteen consumer goods. It includes a very'detailed set of 
taxes, including the federal and state personal income taxes, federal and state corP9rate income 
taxes, Social Security taxes, property taxes, unemployment insurance, excise taxes, sales taxes, 
etc. It has been calibrated to reproduce the 1973 U.S. economy. Recently, a version corresponding 
to the 1983 U:S. economy has been developed. 
I 
\ 
6 
. The Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley model is dynamic in the sense thal consumers face a 

. . " 

choice between current consumption and leisure versus future consumption (which can be 

purchased via savings). The consumer classes act as if they were maximizing a nested CES utility 
function 'over the domain of a CES aggregate of confemporaneous consumer goods and leisure and 
. . . ~ 
,future consumption, subje.ct to their income constraint. The parhmeters of those functions 
determine the shares of income devoted to each commodity, to' saving, and to the. "purchase" of 
leisure. They also determine the two key elasticities in the models - .the elasticity of labor supply 
with respect to the real after tax wage rate, and .the elasticity of saving witt} respect to the real 
after-tax rate of return to capital. 
In the model, consumers have myopic expectations regarding future prices and, in particular, 

regarding the future rate of return to capital. Ballard (1983) and Ball-ard-Goulder (1985) 

. / 

iflcorporate b'oth perfect foresight and limited foresight into this modek Future consumption is 

• • I 
. . 
"acquired" by buying a fixed composition portfolio of real investments that offer an infinite annuity 

of returns. 

The production side of the model is completely ?tatic. T.he model incorporates a constant 

. elasticity of substitution between primary inputs in production (capital and labor) and fixed 
coefficients for intermediate inputs. The modal distinguishes between industrial outputs and 
consumer goods for the, -simple reason that the data are classified differently. Industrial sectors 
involve such categories as forestry and fisheries, metal mining, and publishing and printing, while 
consumers purchase furniture, automobiles, and books. This fact is recognized in the model by 
incorporating a second stage of production which converts industrial outputs into consumer goods. 
This technology is usually modeled as a fixed-coefficient conversion matrix. 
The Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley model assumes that the private sector finances 

marginal investment with the same composition of debt and equity as currently exists in each 

sector. This is the same assumption that Harberger originally used. Investors all hold debt and 

equity in the same proportion. Therefore, this ownership can be aggregated simply into capital 

-"............ f 

7 

ownership. For tax purposes, however, the separate treatment of debt aFld equity is taken into 
account at both the corporate and per,sonal levels. Similarly, the· dividend policies on corporate 
equity are established exogenously. There are no government bonds in the model, since there are 
no government deficits: 
The model is solved· for a sequence (as many as 100) of temporary equHibria, with consumers 
,. " 
allocating income between present and future consumption at each point in time. The path for the .; 
econol'ny is a set of connected equilibria. The connection is 'provided by capital accumulation . 
.. 
Capital 'accumulation is endogenous and' determined by saving. The model starts with a social 

accounting matrix. In the bas-e case the economy is assumed to be in a steady-st~te growth path 

(along which' all relative prices are constant). The model solves for both th.e ~ew steady-state 

. growth path and the transition to it after a 'policy intervention. The authors have frequently' 

addressed the question of how long it takes to effectively settle into a new steady-state growth path. 

, , / 
., ! 
The dynamics of the model are limited, however, in that future .consu/mption is collapsed into a 
composite commodity. Also, the absence of government deficits and the lack of production dynamics 
limits the realism' of the Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley model fQr the analysis of dynamic 
policy issues (such as the adoption of a consumption tax or the elimination of the investment tax 
credit). 
More recently, a whole new generation of models has been developed by Andersson (1987), 
Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1983, 1984, 1987), Ballard (1983), Ballard-Goulder (1985), Bovenberg 
(1984, 1985, 1986), Erlich-Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987), Feltenstein (1984, 1986), Goulder 
(1985), Goulder-Summers (1987), and Jorgenson-Yun (1984). The model in this paper ­
DAGEM - is pretty much in the spirit of this new generation. Accordingly, throughout this chapter 
the DAGEM model will be compared to and contrasted with these recent contributions. 
8 I2.2 THE ECONOMY 
I 
tThe economy is characterized by a sequential market structure in· a finite horizon and discrete 
time frame, t=z, ... ,T~· At period t. all current markels are open. ~pot markets are allowed to · i 
I 
. I, re-open every period. There are no future markets at any t. . J+3 markets are open at every 1: J joutput/consumption goods markets, the physical capital good market, the labor market, and the 

financial assets market. 

In this economy there are three types of agents: consumer groups, industries, and government. 

I 
t 
Agents face a dynamic environment. The economic behavior of every agent is "derived from an 

intertemporal specification of its objectives and constraints.. Intertemporal transfers of wealth are 

allowed and economic decisions are forward looking. 
• r/ 
.\ 
To make ·their real and financial decisions at each t, the economic a~ants use several types ~f 
information. They observe current' prices at t. However, economic decisions are fcrmulated in a 
. . \ 
context of uncertainty about future prices and interest rates. Intertemporal consistency in the 
usual 8trotz (1956) sense is not imposed in the model. Agents are allowed to commit mistakes due 
\ . 
. 10 incorrect expectations. By generally assuming imperfect foresight, decisions ·will be taken that-
could have been improved upon should the agents have accurately foreseen the future. Thus, plans 
. about the future will, in general, be revised. A minimum consistency requirement on individual 
behavior is imposed. Given intertemporally defined objectives and constraints. economic decisions 
are intertemporally consistent in the broad sense that they are the best possible decisions -at every 
moment based on the available information about the future as synthesized by the rules of formation 
of expectations. 
The information set at period t reflects what is known about the economy at 1. It consists of .all 
the structuraf information of individual preferences and technologies. and all the past 
equilibrium/observed prices and quantities. Individuaf expectations at t for all t+1, ... ,T, are based 
on available information as specified in the informatIon set. Expectations are formed as point 
\' 
9 
~ 
·expectations according to specific rules. Expectations are updated when ne~ information comes into t 
t 
the information set. For example, th~ expectations of prices at t+h ·formulated at t and t+1 will,. in , I 
general, be different. In terms of the the information structu're' of the' economy, it is assumed that I 
all the agents agree on what the future prices will b.e: they have h.omogeneous expectations.31 I 
I 
I 
Therefore, the possibility of informational asymmetr"ies across agents is ruled out. 
Atomistic competition in each and every market is assumed. Even though the number of agents 
on each side of the market is finite, it is assumed that enough agents a~e involved to render their 
actions negligible in terms of the overall equilibrium outcomes.4i The concept of Temporary 
Walrasian Equilibrium, (TWE), is adopted to capture the incomplete and sequential aspects of real 
world trading and the limitations of foresight into the future which we wallt to .cai?ture in this ,model 
(see Grandmont (1982) for a detailed discuSsion of the temporary equilibrium literature). All 
current markets are assumed to clear, hence the Walrasian r:tature 
,./ 
/of equilibrium. Also,. 
.\ .I 
. equilibrium in the short run is p'arametric on the expectatio~s of future prices held by Hie 
different ~gents as well as future taxation parameters, hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. 
Actions of the economic agents are based on expectations which may turn out to be incorrect, i. e. 
\ price expectations ar~ not self-fulfilling.SI The link between adjacent periods is endogenously 
provided by.the recursive transitions of the stock variables in the economy. 
2.3 ECONOMIC BEHAVlOR: HOUSEHOLDS 
Qyerview of the Literature 
Early efforts to build dynamic features into the economic behavior of consumers are due to 
Ballard (1983) and Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1983, 1984). Their work has been closely followed by 
several subsequent authors. !n fact, dynamic household behavior is the single most pervasive 
aspect among the models more recent CGE models. 
These models incorporate some form of life-cycle behavior. Household behavior is detarmined 
~. 
" 

I 
~ 
1 0 
by the maximization of an additively separa.ble, time invariant intertemporal utility function. The I 
Jutility function is 'defined over the dom'ain of the consumption goods in the economy. In most of the 

models, leisure is also an argument in utility so that labor supply is optimally determined. 

Utility maximization is subject to a lifetime in~ertemporal budg~t constraint which equalizes 

, the present value of consumers' income and expenditure. Mare recently in Andersson (1987) and 

Bovenberg (1985) the constraint is defined as a sequence of recursive equations of motion on 

wealth. This has the potential advantage of accc;:>mmodating liquidity constraints. However, It should 
 I
! 
I 
be recognized that in the absence of liquidity constraints (Le. whe~ consumers are free to I 
completely borrow against future income), the two specifications of the househoid constraint are 

. essentially equivalent. Furthermore, in both versions saving is optimally determined as a way Of. 

transferring wealth intertemporally. 

,,/ 
/
.\ Some mo'dels now have a sophisticated dynamic speCification of household b~havior. In Ballard 

(1983), BaLiard-Goul.der (1985), '-and Auerbach-Kotlikoff (19'83, 1984, 1987), consumer's 

behavior is embedded in an intergenerational setting. . Each of them has 55 age cohorts 

. . 
simultaneously alive. Some measure of intergenerational altruism is considered in the form of 

. bequest motives. ,In Ballard (1983) and Ballard-Goulder (1985), consumers derive utility' 

directly from bequeathing part of their wealth. Therefore, b'equests assume the form of a scrap 

value of terminal wealt.tl of a generation. In Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1983, 1984, 1987), each 

generation empathizes with the utility of future generations over bequeathed wealth. In addition, 

Ballard (1983) includes detailed demographic projections with the intent of incorporating in the 

, policy analysis the effects of the Post World Wa'r 11 baby-boom. 
In the real world, household decisions also include the optimal allocation of saving among 

alternative phYSical or financial assets. Theories of household portfolio behavior are relatively 

well-established. However, they involve unceitainty as a crucial element. Accordingly. they have 

not been incorporated in the context of the deterministic dynamic models. We will corne back to 

this issue below. 

I 
1 1 
The DAGEM Model 
The if'lformation structure underlyin'g the economic problsr(l ~f 90nsumer group i at pe~iod z 
can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of period z, the consumer observes current 
commodity and labor prices and current interest rates .. Accordingly, the value of the current asset 
. . 
portfolio is obse'rved. Then, the consumer lormulafes expectations .about future prices and 
, anticipates the parameters of future taxation policy. These parameters are used to determine his , 
intertemporal plans for consumptjon, labor supply, and asset portfolio holdings: Due to the 
temporary equilibrium structure of the model, only current plans are str!ctly enforced. The actual I 
intertemporal sequence of plans is obtained from the contemporaneous period decisions associated 
with an intertemporal sequence of optimization problems. 
Intertemporal preferences of consumer group i defined over current and future commodity 
. consumption/labor supply plans are represented by a time separable feJiqrty function of the form: 
. . / 
.I 
where dj is the time-invariant, subjective rate of discount for class i, and Uj(.) is a \vell behaved, 
\ time-in.variant utility function defined over the space of the j outp~t goods yj' an<;i leisure, Hit. 
* * L~isure is given by L rLit' where L i is co~sumer i's total available time. 
The consumer's behavior is constrained by a recursive set of budg~t constraints relating the 
intertemporal patterns of income, spending and savings. At t, consumer group i receives labor 
income, PLtLit, and lump-sum ~ransfers from the government, Tri!'. Also, consumer i receives 
wealth generated income, which includes capital gains: 
. ( 2 ) [ ( 1 -L j e jt) r t + L j e j t { D i v j t/ PjEt - 1 E j t) lW it+ L j [ p jEt - PjEt - 11 E ijt 
where ejt is the share at t of equity j in total wealth of individual i, ejt= p jEt-1 Ejit/W it' and 
·1 

" \ 
I 
\ 
1 2 
Labor and wealth income are taxable according. to a linear progressive income tax schedule. 
Lump-sum transfers from the government are considered tax-exempt. Capital gains are taxed at a 
. I 
diff€rent rate, CGTit0 Accordingly, disposable income at t i~ given by: 
! 
+ ( 1 -C G Tit) Lj [pjEt -.pjEt- 11 E ijt I 
where bit is negative to reflect the fact that marginal tax rates exceed average tax rates, and Tit is 
the marginal income tax rate for household group i. 
At each t, PjtYijt represents pre-tax expenditure of group i in commodity j. Purchase of good j 
is' subject to an ad valorem sales tax. Therefore the total after-tax expenditure of the i-th group in 
/consumption g~ods is Lj~1 + Tjt)PjtYijt. / 
/ 
, 

Given the information above, t~le .recursive set of budget constraints - the equation of. motio,n 

I . 
\ 
for wealth - can for every t be written as: 
·1! 
The terminal constraint on wealth (5) implies that the total present value of current and 
future expected income receipts has to be equal the present value of current and future expected 
spending. 
Savings represent intertemporal transfers of wealth to finance future consumption. 
Accordingly, Wit+ 1 represents the new total wealth at the end of period t to be. transfered into 
period t+ 1 after all expenditures have been incurred. Additional wealth representing the total 
amount of new funds made available by group i to the rest of the economy is invested according to 
criteria detailed below in this section. Savings generated by group i at t are given by 
1 3 
(6) SH=Lj[Bijt+1-Bijt]+[Bigt+1-Bigtl+LjPjEt[Eijt+1-Eijt]· 
Formally, at each period z the economic problem of consurper group i can be stated as the 
.maximization of the expected value at z of his felicity. function subject to the recursive sequence of 
. 	 . . 
. 	~udget constraints, to terminal state constraints, and to a sequence of future price expectations. 
Such problem can be written as: 
subject to: 

i) non-negativity constraint on controls for all zstsT 
 i. 
I 
~ 
ii) eQuation of motion of wealth for all zstsT 	 ~ r; 
(9) W. it+1- Wit~ Lj[Bijt+1-Sijt]+[Bjgt+1-Bigt1+LjPjEt[Eijttf-Eijtl t 
I 
/ 	 I::= bit+ ( 1 - Tit) [p Lt L 1t:-1 ( 1 -\L j e j t) r t + L j~ j t ( D i v j t/PjEt - 1 E j t) ] Wit] + 
1 
J 
iii) state terminal conditions for all isjsJ+1 {includes investment good industry) I 
! 
! 
. I 
1 
In what follows, the time invariant utility function wiil be characterized by a two-level nested 
structure. At the top level, con~umer i will decide about his consumption/leisure allocation 
according to a linearly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas structure. At the lower level, consumers will 
decide about their pattern of disaggregated consumption/leisure according to a linearly 
homogeneous Cobb-Douglas structure. This is equivalent to the following specificatio·n: 
The problem (7)-(11) is solved using control theory techniques, in particular, Pontryagrin's 
1 4 
Maximum Principle to obtain the optimal demand fu.nctions. The relevant Hamiltonian at time t 
[ Wit~ bit+ (1 - Tit) ( p L t Lit+ [ ( 1 - L j,e j t) r t + L j e j t ( 0 i v j t' p j' E t - 1 E j t) 1 Wit) 
+ ( 1 - C G Tit) L j[p j E t- PjEt -11 E ijt+ T r iF L j ( 1 + T j~) PjtYijt] } 
The Hamiltonian function represents the present value at z of the sum of the utility at t derived 
from contemporary consumption and leisure plus the implicit utility value of wealth transferred to 
next period, discounted back to the moment when decisions are being made, t. The dynamic shadow 
price associated ,with the e~uation of motj~n for wealth at t (1 +ajr1qit+1 is; t6 be interpreted as 
/ 
the marginal utility of wealth at t. 
The necessary conditions for optimality at z are:' 
i) 7Quation of motioo for the state yarjable for all ~st~T, 

, 

, (1 4) W it + 1 = W it+ b it+ ( 1 -Tit)[ p L t L it+ [ ( 1 -Lj e jt) r t + L j e j t ( D i v j tl p jEt _1 E j t)J \\1 it] 

ii) state 	terminal' conditions 

* 
( 1 5) 	 W iz= W i (initial state condition) 
(16) 	 WiT+ 1=0 (final state condition) 
iii) adjoint equation for the marginal utility of wealth for all zstsT 
iv)tfamiltonian varia1iona[ conditions for control variables H it and Yijt for all zstsT ­
..a. 
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Closed form solutions to this problem are obtained in Appendix II: ·It is enough here to say -that 
both the demands for different consumption goods and .the supply. of labor depends on the 
contemporaneous interest rate and on the respective price. Also, through the marginal utility of 
" wealth, both the demands for different consumption goods and the .supply of labor depend on 
. . 
expectation about future labor prices and interest rates, but not 1uture commodity prices. In turn, 
savings behavior depends on all c.ontemporaneous prices an9 interest rate, as well as on future 
labor prices and interest rates, but not on future c~mmodity prices. 
2.4 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: PRODUCERS 
Overview' of the Literature 
The efforts to build dynamic feature.s into the economic behavior of producers are more recent 
. \ . 
and less widely adopted. The fir£t attempts are due to Bovenberg (19B4, 19B5) and Summers 
(1985). Dynamic beha~ior has been more fully incorporated in the recent models of Andersson 
\ . 
. (19B7), Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987), and Goulder-Summers {19B7} . 
. Part of the reason why production side dyna'!lics has been more slowly adopted is the weak 
supply of accepted theori,es referring to the dynamic behavior of the firms. In the models referred 
to above, dynamic production and investment behavior are induced by the existence of capital 
adjustment costs and linked to Tobin's q theory. Adjustment costs are designed to capture both the 
incomplete mobility of capital across industries and installation costs (Le. the costs of adjusting 
capital towards its optimal level). 
Adjustment costs can be conceived as internal to the firm and measured in terms of foregone 
output along the lines of Lucas (1967). This is the way the above model approaches the concept. 
Alternatively, adjustment costs can be viewed as actual external costs incurred together with the 
1 6 
purchase costs, along the lines of Goul9 (1969). 

The firms in th~ economy maximize .their market value as the present discounted value of the· 

future stream of dividends. In An~ersson (1987), firms are seen as maximizing the present 

discounled value of net cash flow. Maximization is constrained by the adjustment cost technology 

. and an equation of motio"n describing the evolution of the capital stock. It should be noted that 

I 
" t 
under exogenbus dividend/retention rules the two problems are equivalent. 
The models with static formulation of producers' behavior are characterized by passive I1 ) 
investment behavior. Investment merely accommodates to saving in the economy. With adynamic ~ 
I 
f 
-
formulation induced by adjustment costs, real investment decisions are forward looking. I 
! 
t 
Investment is endogenously and optimally determined by th~ firms. A fundamental difference 
I bet~een the short run in which capital stock is given, and long run in which the level of capital is 
f 
~/
allowed to be op.timally determined is emphasized. / i 
.\ /
, 

. This extra richness of production dynar:nics is not without costs. ·A careful look at the summary 
 i\ 
1 
tables will clearly show an inverse relation between the adoption of dynamic features", in production 

and the lev~1 of disaggregation of the production side of the economy·. In fact, with produc!ion 

dynamics the dimension of the problems is immensely increased. Let us be more specific. 

In a static f·rarnework with constant returns to scale production technology,the output level is 

indeterminate. The optimal allocation of inputs can be obtained by cost minimization with any 

feasible output level generating zero profits. Such zero profit conditions are used to solve for the 

, output prices in terms of the factor prices and hence to reduce the dimensionality of the problem 
from the number of commodities and factors to the flumber of factors. Thus, even if the model deals 
with 30 production sectors, the computation of an economic equilibrium can take place using only 
the dimensionality of the primary inputs in the economy. 
Now, under certain regularity conditions on the production and adjustment costs technologies, 
leading to enough concavity of the optimality objective, the intertemporal output path for the firm 
is endogenously, optimally, and uniquely determined even with constant returns to scale 
\ 
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technologies (see Pereira (1986,1987». Accordingly, with adjustment costs in the model 
optimal profits will in general be non·zero. T.his result h1:ls crucial implications for the 
computation of equilibrium in the models with production dynamics. VYith adjustment costs, no" 
reduction of dimensionality is possible. The qurse of dimensionaiity returns as a binding 
constraint. 
. . 
The introduction of adjustrnent costs adds another significant complication to the model. With 
capital bein'g less than perfectly mobile 'in the economy, different rates of return on capital will 
exist in different sectors. This is a difficult· problem tp tackle conceptually in the absence of 
uncertainty. In the real world, producer maximization choices also include choice of financial 
ratios (debtlequ~ty) and payout rates (dividend/retained earnings), These financial subjects are 
difficult, and much of this behavior is still taken as exogenous by the modelers. "'Ie will come back 
to these issues below. ,,/ 
/ 
/ 
The DAGEM Model 
The information structu're underlying the economic problem of production sector j at period z 
can be summarized as follows. At the beginning of period z, the producer observes current 
commodity and labor prices and interest rates. The producer then formulates 'expectations about 
future prices and anticipates the p"rameters of futu.re taxation policy. This information is used to 
determine the intertemporal plans for output supply, demand for labor, investment and 
intermediate inputs, and demand for funds in the fOim of outstanding bonds and equity. Due to the 
temporary equilibrium structure of the model, only current plans are strictly enforced. The actual 
intertemporal sequence of plans is obtained from the contemporaneous period decisions associated 
with an intertemporal sequence of optimization problems. 
Production technology at each t is represented by a time-invariant Leontieff structure of the 
form: 
1 8 
The value-added production function, VAjt=Fj(Ljt,Kjt}, is twice continuou.sly differentiable, 
stric.tly increasing in every input, and concave. 
We further assume that adjusting capital stock 10wards' its optimal level .is not costless .. This 
ide.a is captured by sector-specific cost functions Ita la Gould" (1968). defined over gross capital 
stock accumulation. the adjustment cost functions can be interpreted to include both' acquisition 
and internal, non-market adjustment costs. The twice continuously differentiable investment cost 
function for sector j is: 
(21 ) T C -j ( I j t) =Pit [ I j t+ C j ( I j t) ] , 

Jhe adjustment cost function has the following properties:61 

./' 
/ 
/ 
, The evolution of capital stock through time - reflecting actual investment - is given by the' 
equation of motion: 
where 0 jt is the depreciation rate of capital stock installed in sector j at period 1. Depreciation 
rates are sector-specific. 
The equation of motion of capital reflects the idea that, in the short run, capital stock is fixed, 
i.e., the capital stock in existence at t is not a decision variable at t, but it is determined by optimal 
Idecisions in previous periods. However, at t investment decisions will be made determining the 
I 
capital stock at t+1. In the long run, capital stock is variable. 
, I I 
Each sector of production j faces ad valorem taxes on the use of fabor services, which represent 1 
I
! 
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the employer's portion of Social Security taxes. Therefore, if T U is the ta~. rate. assumed constant 
across sectors of production, the cost for sector j of one unit of labor is given by (1 + T U)PLto 
As a consequence of its decisions at period t, the sector realizes ~ross profits njt - payment of 
capital services plus economic profits, Le., sales revenues minus non-investment expenditures: 
EOach sector j is subject to an ad valorem ~orporate tax on njt- Th~' after-tax gross profits are 
i 
,. 
(1-T cjt) n jt, where Tcjt is the sector-specific corporate tax rate at t. ° 
On the.other hand, investment expenditures benefit from an investment tax credit which is an t 
l 
t 
ad valorem subsidy. Actual investment expenditures are (1-ITCjt)PIt[l jt+Cj(ljt)]­ I 
Interest payments ~re deductible from the corporate tax base so tha)'ihe net interest paid on 
.\ / 
outstanding bonds is (1-Tcjt)rt~ji: I 
I 
t 
. 
Also, depreciation allowances DAjt are to be deducted from the corporate tax b~se. Let l2'jt and 
\ K'jt be the depreciatio-n rates for tax purposes and capital stock for tax purposes, respectively. 
The after-tax gross profits are increased by T Cjt0'jtK'jto 
Industry j's net cash· flow at t NCFjt can be written as: 
(27) 	NCFjt = 

-

= ( 1 - T c j t){ [p j t -:L f{ a j fP ft) ] F j ( K j t! L j t) - ( 1 + T L t) p L t L j t} - ( 1 -I T C j t)[ p It Ij t+ C j (I j t) ] ­
The discounted value at t of the intertemporal sequence of net cash flows is obtained from the 

sequence of current and future expected market rates of return rt's. 

The producers' dynamic behavior with respect to real economic variables is determined by the· 

maximization of the present value of net discounted cash flows at each moment z subject to strictly 

20 
convex adjustment costs, the equation of motion for the capital stock, and future price expectations. 
Formally, this is for z~t~T, z~s~t, 
1
.( 28) 	 Max{y fl,1 ;K}Lt[ns {1 +rsr ] NC Fjt= Lt[n s {1 :rsr1]. 
{ ( 1 - T cj t) [[ p jt - L t ( a j tP tt) ] F j( K j t, l jt} - ( 1 + T l t) P l t l j t] - ( 1 - IT C j t) [p I t I j t + C j (1 jt) ] } 
subject to: 
i} nod-negativity constrajnts for all z~t~T and 1~fsJ, 
(29) 	 Yjft~O, ljt~O, Kjt~ 0 ; 
-
ii} eQuation of motioo of capital stock for all z~~T 
iii} state end cond~ 
,..-: 
/ 
(31) 	 Kjz=K . * j / 
-	 - \ ( 3 2) 	 scrap value of capital at T +- 1 is zero . 
. In what follows, the time invaripnt_ value added production function will be characterized by a 
lineflrly homogeneous Cobb-Douglas structure: 
Also, the adjustment cost function is a 5sumed to be quadratic: 
This problem is solved using contrpl theory techniques, in particular, Pontryagrin's Maximum 
~rinciple, to obtain the optimal factor demand and supply functions. With this choice of functional 
forms the Hamiltoniao associated at t with our problem becomes: 
{ ( 1 - T c j t) [[ p j t -L f ('a j fp f t ) ] [( l j t) a j ( K j t) 1 - a j ] - (1 + T l t ) p l t l j t ] 
'. 2 -1 
-(1-ITCjt)Plt[ljt+·5b j ljt -]+(1 +rt+1.) qjt+1 [ljt+(1-0 j }Kjt]} 
21 
\ 
The Hamiltonian function at t represents the present value at z of the sum of the net cash flow 
at t derived from contemporary production activities plus the impu~ed (shadow) discounted net cash 
flow value of capital to be installed next periqd. The dynamic shadow price associated with the 
. e.quation of m~tion for capital at t is (1 +rt+1r 1qjt+l' This is to be interpreted as the marginal 
,value at t of capital to be installed at t+ 1. 
The necessary conditions for optimality are: 
i) eQuation of motion for the state 'variable for all zst~T 
ii) state terminal cooditions 
(initial state condition) 
(final co-state condition) ,/ I 
/ 
iii} adjoint eQuation for 'he co-state yariable for all z~t~T 
- \­
iv} Hamiltonian yariational conditions for control variables lit and Ljt for all z~tsT 
(4 0 ) ( 1 - I T C j t) Pit{ 1 + b j I j t 1= ( 'I + r t + 1 ) - 1 q j t ~ 1 
Closed form solutions to this problem are obtained in Appendix III. Demand for labor and 
intermediate inputs as well as output supply depend on all current prices and on the rate of 
interest. No future prices are relevant. However, investment demand is forward looking in the 
sense that it not only depends on the current price of the investment good but also on next period's 
interest rate and all the other future prices via the shadow price of capital. In turn: demand for 
new funds depends on all the current prices and on the rate of interest as well as on all the future 
prices and rates of interest via investment demand. 
22 
2.5 ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR: GOVERNMENT 
Qyerview of the Literature 
TWG issues dominate the modeling of governmen! behavior. First, government behav.ior 
typically has been seen in the CGE literature for tax policy evaluation as constrained by yearly 
balanced budgets. (see, for example, Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985)). The analysis of 
government deficits and public debt in a CGE context requires adynamic setting. Second, the level 
of government expenditures is either exogenouly given as in Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1984, 1987), 
80'lenberg (1984, 1985), Feltenstein (1984, 1986), and Jorgenson-Yun (1984), or 
endogenously (but not optimally) determined by the balanced budget conditions as in 
"" 
/ 
Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985), Andersson (19B7), Erlich~Ginsburgh-Heyden
\ ! 
(1987), Goulder (1985), and Goulder-S~mr:ners (1987). In the second case, the composition of 
. \ . 
public expenditures is often optimally determined. However, the level of governmont ~xpenditures 
,can only be e.ndogenously and optimally determined if the gov~rn!J1ent is seen as an intertemporally 
optir11izing agent and is allowed to run deficits. 
The first attempts to deal with government deficits in CGE tax models are due to Auerbach-
Kotlikoff (1984), Feltenstei.n (1984), Hnd Goulder (1985). In Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1984), 
government expenditures are exogenous. They grow at the rate of growth of population. However, 
, given the tax structure and tax revenues, yearly deficits and surpluses are allowed, subject to an 
. intertemporal constraint thalthe present value of future tax revenues equals the present value of 
future expenditures. In Feltenstein (1984, 1986), government expenditures are also exogenously 
'given. He also allows the government to run deficits to finance expenditures in excess to tax 
revenues. However, surpluses are returned to consumers in the form of transfers. Accordingly, 
-
government is not subject to any constraint regarding the future repayment of public debt. In 
Goulder (1985). the government maximizes a static social welfare function subject to a balanced 
23 
, , 
budget constraint. This follows the optimal allocation of government eXP.9fiditures along the lines 

of Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985). The model is ge,neralized to allow for exogenous 

changes 'in the time path of government expenditures .. Two financing alternatives are considered and 

. contrasted: additional tax revenues and bond issuance. 
. The model in this paper attempts to address both the incorporation of deficits and the ldetermination of government expenditures. The path of government expenditure~ and the path of I 
. , I, deficits/surpl~ses (and therefore the path for debt) are endogenously and optimally determined. 

The government is seen as maximizing an intertemporal social welfare function given the tax 

structure. Optimization is subject to a sequence of recursive equations of 'motion reflecting the 
 I
evolution of the public debt, allowing for government budget imbalances. At each moment 
t 
government's decisions are based on the consideration of its current and future interests and 
, ~ 
constraints.. Its evaluaHon of the future depends crucially on the expectat~hs about the future state 

/ 
 I
, of the economy, in particular .its. ex~ectations about future prices. 'This extra richness in the 
\ I 
treatment of government behavior allows the examination of government debt policies in a truly II 
. , ~ 
r, 
dynamic setting. Also, financial crowding out of private investment induced by government deficits ~" 
\ can be analyzed in a more meaningful way than in Auerbach-Kottlikoff (1987) and Feltenstein 
(1986) in which deficits are .endogenous but not optimally determined. 
The DAGEM Model 
The information structure underlying the economic problem of government at period z can be 

summarized as follows. At the beginning of period z, the producer observes current commodity and 

labor prices and interest rates. Also, at the beginning of period z, the governn'lent formulates 

expectations about future prices and the parameters of future taxation policy. The government then 

determines its intertemporal plans for demand for consumption goods. labor, and investment as 

well as demand for funds in the form of new outstanding bond. Due to the temporary equiflbrium 

structure of the model, only current plans are to be strictly enforced. The actual intertemporal 

j 
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; sequence of plans is obtained from the contemporaneous period decisions' associated with an 
intertemporal sequence of optimization problems, 
The governm~nt engages in four economic activities', First, it collects taxes according to an 
.. . 
exogenously given. tax regime. Second, it transfers discretionary lump-sum amounts to the private 
sector.. Third, it purchases consumption goods, capital, and labor to accomp~ish general government 
activities through, the production of a public good, Finally, since general government activities are 
constrained by a' recursive set of budget constraints, and it is allowed to run yearly deficits, the 
government is also allowed to engage in the sale of public bonds to finance such imbalances, 
The government raises revenue by levying taxes on the private sector. It is assumed that the 
go~ernment knows exactly how to compute the tax revenue it is going to collect at 1. It is as if the 
government knows the closed form net dem~:tnds of all the agents in the economy and therefore the 
,/' 
tax pase. The governmer.'! can aiso infer future tax revenues which an;/ relevant for current 
decisions from future price expectatio~s. \ 
The tax system and tax pO,licies are institutionally given as' the outcome of a 'process not 
,captured by the model?' Six classes of taxes are consider-ed in this model as described in the 
preceding sections. The tota! revenues they generate at t are accumulated as follows: 
1. ad valorem labor tax on labor services used by the different industries (j=i, ... ,J;I) 
and government, representi.ng Social Security taxes, u'nemployment insurance, and workmen's 
compensation and which generates revenue LTt: 
. It should be noted that government is seen as paying taxes to itself on the use of labor. 
Consequently, the income effects of such a tax cancel out. However, the price effects me.asure the 
opportunity cost to government of hiring labor. Notice a/so that marginal labor tax rates in the 
private and public sectors are different, reflecting better pension plans for government employees: 
2. ad vaiorem corporate income tax on i~dustry j=1, ... ,J,1 generates revenue CTt nBt of 
\ 
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interest deductibility and depreciation allowances: 
..i •.• 
3. ad valorem jnvestment tax crediis ITet: on industry j=1, ... ,J;I, 
. 	 ..
s 
I4. ad valorem sales tax generates revenue STt: 
I 

5. a progressive personal income tax represented by a linear function for each i 
generates revenue ITt: 
(4 5) ITt:: L i { • b i+ Tit [ p L t L D t i+ [ ( 1 -L j e j t) r t + Lie j t ( D iv j t' E j t) 1Wit] 
6. capital gains 	ta~: / 

/ 

Accordingly, total taxes cQllec~d at time tare TTt: 
Total lump-sum redistributive transfer paymen.ts., i.e., transfers to households at t (Social 
Security, food stamps, AF:DC, etc.) are exogenously gwen and represented by Tri=LjTrit . 
.The basic intertemporal consistency requirement imposed on government behavior is that its 
actions are constrained by an intert~mporal balanced budget condition. The discounted sum of a" 
, the government expenditures on commodities, labor, and new capital investment cannot exceed the 
discounted sum of all its revenues, i.e. tax revenues net of transfers. The intertemporally 
recursive specification of the budget constraint can be written for each 'z~t$T in the fo"rm: 
with end conditions 
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... (49) LGz=LG 
(50) LGT+ 1 =0. 
Optima"1 . government spending is derived from the maximization of a social welfare function 
over the domain of an aggregate public good. Such public good is produced usiog capital, labor, 'and 
intermediate inputs according to a well behaved production function. This public good is not subject 
to market pricing. Accordingly, its production is financed by tax income and other s'ources of 
government income. This optimization objective is consistent with our m0geling of consumers' 
. 
behavior in which the public good" does not enter the set of budget constraints and is not a decision 
variable. This is equivalent to having the public good enter additively in time t to the private 
utility functions. Thus the marginal rates of substitution between private goods do not depend on 
the' level of availability of the public good. The government is then assumed to' act empathetically 
, , / 
\ ! 
with,'the private consumers according to a constrained social utiLity maximi~ing problem.81 
The social welfare function over the domain of· the aggregate public good can be expressed 
indirectly in terms of a well-behaved, time invariant utility function defined at every t over the J 
commodities' and labor and capital services: 
The intertemporal government preferences at z are characterized by an additively separable 
intertemporal felicity function of the form: 
wh~re Og is the time invariant subjective rate of discount for the government. 
The government's optimization problem at each period z can 
maximization of the expected value of its felicity function subject to 
budget constraints as follows: 
be formally stated as the I 
the recursive sequence of I 
. ~
. I I 
I 
i 
I 
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( 53) Max{y, K, L} {Lz~t~T( 1 +ag j-(t-z) U 9 (Kgt ,Lgt,yg 1 t,···,ygJ t)} 
subject to: 
" 
i) noo-negativity constrajnts for all z~t~T., 
( 54) ygjt?-O for all j= 1 , ... ,J, Lg t~O, Kgt~ 0 
ii) equation of motion for government liabilities, for each 'z~tS;T, . 
(.55) 	L G t+ 1 =( 1+ rt) LGt+[Trt+! jPjtYgjt+ (1 +t 9 Lt)PLtLgt+Pltlgt1-TT t 
iii) end conditions for government liabilities 
(initial condition) 
(57) 	 LGT+ 1 =0 (terminal condition) 
iv) equation of motion for capital stock for all z~tsT 
, . 	 / 
(58) 	Kgt+1=lgt+(1-0gt)Kgt I 
v)' end conditions for governrrlent capital stOck 

• 
(59) 	Kgz=K 9 (init(al condition) 
( 6 0) 	scrap valu~ of capital at T + 1 is zero. 
In what follows, government social welfare function is assumed to be a Iioearly homogeneous 
Cobb-Doug las fu nction: 
The interpretation of a function like (61) should be stressed again. Assume the ,public good Gt 
is produced using capital, labor, and consumption goods according. to a CRTS ~obb-Douglas 
production function. Assume also that the public good Gt enters additively in the private utility 
functions in ~he form agiLnGt' Now government acts empathetically taking into consideration the 
"\ 
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private utility derived from the public good. Then (61) can be interpret.ed as an utilitarian 
criterion of the form LjagiLnGt, or given the nature of the public good LnGtLiagi', The last step to 
recover (61) is to normalize Liagi= 1-. 
This problem 'is solved using control theory techniques, j.n particular, Pontryagrin's Maximum I 
Principle, to obtain the optimal demand functions. With 'the above specificatiph of the government 
social welfare function the Hamiltonian becomes I 
"" The Hamiltonian function represents the sum of the utility at t derived )rom contemporary I 
I Iconsumption of the public good plus the implicit utility value of liabiliti~s transfered to next 
4 
tperiod, plus the' implicit discounted' Utiiity ~alue of capifal stock to be transfered to next period. 
I 
~ 
The dynamic shadow price asso'ciated, with the equation of motion for liabilities is (1 +Ogr1qgt+1 . l 
jThis is to be jnterpret~d as the marginal social utility of government liabilities at 1. Also, 
-' {1 +Ogr1qkgt+1iS the dynamic shadow price associated with the equation of motion for capital at I 
t. This is to be interpreted as the marginal social utility of government capital at 1. I 
The following are necessary conditions for optimality at t: 

i) equation of motion for the ·state variable LGt for all zstsT 

ii) state terminal conditions for LG 

(initial state condition) 

(fina! state condition) 

,-" 
I 
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iii) adjoint eguafion for the marQinal utiiity of liabifities for all z~t~T I I 
iv) eQuation of motion for the state yariable Kg for all z~t~T . 
v) state terminar conditions for Kg 
(initial state condition) 
(final co-state condition) 
vi) adjoint eQuation for the marginal utility of capital for all zstsT 
- /: 
vii) . .Hamiltonian variational conditions for control variables Lgi, 'gt' Yjgt' for all zstsT 
! 
1 . ( 7 2) a 9 L ( 1 / Lg t) = (1 +d9 r q9l + 1 \( 1 + T 9 L t) p L t 
(73) agj(1'/Ygjt}=(1+dgr1qgt+1Pjt 
Closed form solutions to this problems are obtained in Appendix IV. It is enough here to say 
that government demand ,for labor and the different consumption goods dep8nd on current own prices 
- no cross price effects - and current interest rate, as well as on future interest rates, Trls and 
TT's via the shadow prices. In turn, investment demand depends on c!Jrrent and next year's price of 
the investment good - no cross price effects - and on current and next year's interest rate, as well 
as on future interest rates, Tr's and TT's via the shadow prices. Finally, demand for new funds 
depends directly on all the current and future market prices. 
I 
\ 
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2.6 EINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL DECISIO~ 
Overview of the Literature 
A dynamic economic -structure not only provides the ideal environmenf to m0gel many features 
. . 
-of ~conomic behavior, it also permits one to incorporate the finaQCial side of the economy. If the 
government is" allowed to run deficits, the question of deficit financing automatically follows. If 
. 
investment is optimally determined and returns to capital are different acros~- sectors, problems of 
investment financing arise. If there are several financial assets in the economy - government 
bonds, private bondS, and equity (or simply phYSical capital installed in different sectors), the 
problem of allocation of saving among assets with potentially diJferent returns aris.es: 
. The different CGE models for tax policy evaluation vary greafly with respect)o the extent of 
. .,/ 
their attention to ·the financial side of the economy. At one extreme are the models in Ballard­
.\ ! 
Fulierton-ShovE?n-Whalley (1985),. '~n~ersson (1987), Ballard (1983), Ballard-Goulder I 
t 
a,(1985), Bovenberg (1985, 1986), and Erlich-Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987), which are devoted 
,exclusively t.o the real side of the economy. In turn, Auerbach:.Kotlikoff (1984, 1987), 
I 
Feltenstein (1984, 1986). and Goulder (1985) allow for government debt. In these models saving I 
'finances changes in government debt and physical capital. Private and public assets are perceived Iby the households as perfec~ substitutes. The allocation of savings merely adjusts to the relative i 
demands for funds. I 
I 
1Feltenstein (1984, 1986) is the only model surveyed which introduces money. Government 
.. d,eficits are financed by issuing money and bonds according to an exogenously given rule. Money ·is 1 
demanded by consumers for transaction motives and an exogenously given fraction as a store of 
value. On the other hand, government bonds and phYSical capital are the vehicles for the 
intertemporal transfer of wealth. 
Summers (1985) and Goulder-Summers (1987) introduce firm specific equity capital. 
Different assets earn different rates of return. However, such rates are equal up to constant and 
\ 
.L 
3 1 
exogenous sector specific risk premia. There-fore, the introduction of cohstant exogenous risk 
premia, as helpful as it may be in the context of calibration, does" not solve the main issue of the 
non-optimality of the allocation of saving. Also. talking about risk prEmia in a deterministic 
~ context is somewhat unsatisfactory. 
The most advanced contribution in the modeling of savil1gs allocation in a CGE setting is found in 
Slemrod (1980. 1983) in the context of a static one-period model. In hjs model. consumers act 
. . 
according to atwo-stage. separable decision prc;:>cess. They first decide on how much to save. Then 
they decide on the allocation of saving accordtng to an indirect utility function dependent on the 
rates of return and ~ variances offered by the different~ assets in~the ~ economy. The source of 
riskiness in the economy comes from an uncertain marginal product of capital. On the other hand, I, 
aside from portfolio decisions, the rest of the economy is insulated from uncertainty. I
•IThe most complete contribution in terms of the treatment of the corp6rate financial rules is 
. / I, / Fullerton-Gordon (1983). ~ In a v~riant of the Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985) model, 
Fullerton and Gordon have capit'al intensity and optimal financial decisions jointly determined 
. through a two-stage process. The cost of financing capital is minimized by trading off the tax 
. ;advantages of debt against the expected real bankruptcy costs inherent with high debVequity ratios. I I 
Given the optimal debt/equity ratio, the level of investment is chosen such that at the margin the ~ 
return on equity equals the return on oonds plus an e~ogenous risk premium. 
The Daoem Model 
The DAGEM model considers a whole menu of financial assets. private and public bonds. and 
firm-specific equity. In terms of equilibrium analysis, consumers typically supply funds and 
production sectors, and government typically demands funds by issuing equity and priVa!8 bonds and 
public bonds, respectively. 
The current interest rate as well as the individual and market availability of funds- are 
endogenously determined by the equilibrium conditions. On the other hand, individual asset 
32 
portfolio decisions are passive. Also, corporate fin.ancial rules and retention policies are either 
exogenous to the model or follow exogenous reaction rules parametric on the state of crucial 
vari~bles in the economy. 
~ The non-opti~ality of the allocation of saving and'the absence or exogeneity of corporate 
fin?lncial rules reflect the way uncertainty is treated in the model. . Uncertainty is solved by 
... .. . 
endowing the agents with point expectations about future prices.' Under' such circumstances, 
consumers either: expect different rates of return (inclusive of risk premium) across assets, in 
which case they will buy only one asset (that with highest rate), or they expect equal rates of 
return: in which case they are indifferent about the asset composition of their portfolio. There is 
no .way of trading off rates of return and risks to obtain an optimal interior solution to the problem 
of the allocation of saving. In the DAGEM a," the assets are expected to yield the s5lme after-tax rate 
,,/ 
of return (eventually corrected by exogenous risk premia), and therefore are/perceived as perfect 
, ! 
I 
substitutes. Also, the endogenous d'~tenTlination of debt/equity policy parameters by trading off 
- ,\' 
expected bankruptcy costs and the preferential tax treatment of bonds is difficult and problematic 
, in the absenc.e of uncertain~y. 
. 'Despite the shortcomings of the analysis, the consideration of different financial assets is very 
important. First, it allow consideration of exogenous debt/equity and dividend/retention corporate 
financing rules and therefore ,several sources of corporate investment financing: bonds, equity, and 
retained earnings. Second, it allows the model to capture the fact that different assets are treated 
, differently by the tax code both at the personal and corporate income levels. 
Let us address now the financial decisions of consumers. Wealth Wit+ l' representing the total 
amount of funds made avaifable by consumer group i to the rest of the economy, is to be invested. 
There is a menu of assets in which savings FS jt can be invested: private bonds, equity, and 
government bonds. 
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The 2J+3 financial assets are perceived by 'consumers as perfect subsfitutes, because' all the 
assets are expected to yield the same after-tax rate of return. Accordingly, the asset composition 
of the portfolio is a matter of indifference for .consumers. The only non-tdvial financial decision is 
• the amount of funds made available by the group to the rest of the economy: 
The actual composition of the portfolio holdings is' determined by the market equilibrium 

conditions. Furthermore. the portfolio composition will be the same for aiL consumer groups. Each 

grout> i will o~n, at t, a fraction of the ma-rket. portfolio which corresponds to its share of the total 

wealth owned by consumers at 1. Accordingly, group i's, holdings at t of equity and private and 

public debt are given by: 

. 
(76) WU=LjBijt+Bigt+LjPjEt-1Eijt 
/ 
I 
To sum uP. financial allocation of savings is exogenous to consumers but endogenous to the ., 
'i 
model. Also, the equilibrium conditions determine the equilibrium rate of return' parametrically I
on corporate and government financing rules. However, due to the nature of the tax code, different 	 t 
I 
!consumer groups will have different after tax rates of return on their portfolios. I 
I 
Financing its real investment, .production sector j is constrained in the following way for all I 
I 
I 
z~tsT: 
(80) FD jt=(1-ITCjt)PIt[ljt+Cj(ljt)]+(1-Tcjt)rWtBjt+ 
(1-CGTjt)[PjEt-PjEt-1 lEjt -REjrTcjt'~"jtK'jt 
with terminal condition FLjT + 1 =0. 
~ 
! 
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Th.iS means that real invest.JT1ent activities and the payment of interest on outstanding debt at t 
 I 
. . .. 
are financed through retained earnings, REjt, and external funds, Fjtt which represent th'e' 
. . 
incr~ment in the financial liabilities of the sector FLjt. Financial liabilities must be liquidated by 
the end of the model horizon. ! 
Dividend-retention policies are exogenously given. Corporate dividend-retention policies are I 
Irepresented by parameter 0njtt the fraction of the after-tax gro:s profits generated at t which is 
retained by industry j. The remainder, (1-0njt), represents the distributed p~rtioi1 of after-tax I 
earnings. Tot,al dividends at t, (1-0njt)( 1-T cjt) n jt, are distributed among the t-th period I
shareholders. Notice that this criterion is consistent with the fact that the amount of capital in use " 
"'" 
,f 
at. t by sector j is fixed so that gross profits reflect the existent capital sJe)ck and should be 
/ 1 
, ! 
distributed among those who own it, the t-th period shareholders. i 
I 
! 
Corporate financing policies are exogenously given. External funds totalling FDjt,are obtained 
by issuing a~ditional equity and fixed price bonds: 
I 
I 
f 
Issuance of new bonds and equity is governed by exogenous continuous corporate financing rules 
represented in this model by' parameter 0 Ejt. Such policy "rules can be described as follows: I 
I 
i 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
with end conditions, 
5 
* * (84) PjEz-1 E jz= P jEz-1 E j and PjETEjT+ 1=0 I
1 
; 
Perfect capital markets are assumed such that the price of equity at z PEjz is the present ~ t 
~ 
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. . 
discounted value of the fut~re expected stream of diyidends per share DiVejt/~jt9/ 
Even though the real and financial decisions of firms are independently discussed, they are in a 
general equilibrium sense, interdependent. I~ fact, financial decisions will affect th~ current 
, market prices and rate of, interest, and they will directly and indirectly feedback into sector j's 
real side decisions. Consider the impact of changes in the dividend-retention rule .. First, there is 
a direct general equilibrium effect in the sense that chang~s in 0 1tjt change the amount of external 
funds to be demanded and ,therefore the equilibri'um prices. Second, there rs an indirect general 
equilibrium 'effect, via the change in disposable income - change in dividend income - of the 
different consumer groups. Now consider the impact of changes in the corporate finance rule . 
. First, even though there is no direct contemporaneous general equilibrium effect, th'ere will be 
/ 
, ! 
,'subsequent effects induced by the ~hanges in interest payments. Second, since the market i,nterest 
l 
\ . 
rate and the effective rate of return on equity are different, a different debVequity ratio affects 
disposable income of consumers in subsequent periods. 
Government deficits and surpluses, which repre'sent cha-nges in government !labilities, are 
accommodated by open market operations in the bond market. These operations reflect the net 
demand for new funds by government: 
(87) LGDt+1-LGt=~8gt=FDgt 
(88) FD gt=rtLGt+[Trt+2:jPjtyDgjt+(1 + T 9Lt)PLt LDgt+PltlDgt]-TTt. 
The two different methods of government financing spending, taxation, and bond financing have 
different effects in the economy. This is a central issue in the model. 
, 
I " 
36 I2.7 ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM: TEMPORARY WAlRASIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND TRANSITIONS 
I 
Oyeeyiew of the Literature 

Virtually all of the available CGE models for tax policy evaluation are characterized by 
 . I I 
Wqlrasian market clearing assumptions. Also, all markets are perfectly- competitive. Atomistic 
com'petition among agents is assumed even though only a finite number 'of agents are considered. I 
Virtually, no market disequilibria or price stickiness are consjdered.. A recent exception is I 
provided by Erlich-Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987). In their model of. the Belgium -economy, the 
. . 
wage 
t 
rate is fixed in the short run. Therefore, in the short-run disequilibrium in the labor market 
will generate endogenous unemployment. However, in the long 
• 
rate are flexible, and accordingly, all mark~ts clear. 
run all prices including the wage 
~iven the dynamic nature of behavior in the economy, mark '3t-clearing /prices in each period 
depend on expectations of future price~' .and\ on tax, variables in the economy. There are essentially 
two ways of interpreting the economic equilibrium in such a dynamic context. If future prices are 
I
t.. 
t 
~ 
,perfectly anticipated (Le., expectations are self-fulfilling), a perfect foresight equilibrium 
\ 
prevails. Then, future actions are merely the implementation of current decisions for future 
periods. However, if price expectations are not perfe9t (Le. agents make mistakes with re.spect to 
future prices), then a temporary or short-run equilibrium prevails. Markets crear, and clearing 
prices depend on future price expectations. Current plans for the future are typically not I 
I
, precisely implemented. They will be revised as more or better information becomes available to 
, 't~e economic agents. I 
Jhe DAGEM Model 
Atomistic competition in every market is assumed. Even though the number of agents on each 
side of the market is finite, it is assumed that enough agents are involved to render their actions 
negligible in terms of the overall equilibrium o'utcomes. The concept of Temporary 'vValrasian 
37 
Equilibrium is adopted to capture the incomplete and ~equential aspects oJ. real world trading and 
the limitations of foresight into the future which we want to captUl:e in this model. All current 
markets are assumed to clear, hence the Walrasian nature of equilibrium. Also. equilibrium in the 
short run is parametric on the expectations of future prices held by the different agents as well as
. . 
future taxation parameters, hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. Actions of the economic 
agents are ,based on expectations which may turn out to be incorrect. i. e. price expectations are not 
self-ful.filling. Therefore, the intertemporal equilibrium path in this eco~omy is conceived as a 
sequeFlce of short-run, temporary equilibria parametric on future price expectations. 
The lin~ between adjacent short-run equilibria is provided by the' optimal transitions rules 
for the individual agents. In fact, given equilibrium prices, consumers decide not only how much to 
. purchase of the several commodities available in the economy, but also how much to save, which is' 
.." 
the change in the stock of privately owned wealth. The same .is tru~/ about producers and 
/ 
.\ / 
government in terms of their decisions on the evolution of their capital stock and financial 
liabilities. 
An equilibrium solution for our economy is a sequence of price ve.ctors Pt and quantity vectors 
\ 
. qt defined over {1, ... ,t, ... ,T} of the form Pt=(P1 t,···,PJt;PLt;PIt;rt} and qt=(y 1t,···,yJt;Lt;lt;F). 
The vectors satisfy the foHowing conditions: 
i} For eacti and every 1szsT, and for i=1 .... I, given prices PZ' consumer group 
maximizes the expected value of its intertemporal preferences subject to a recursive set of budget 
constraints and. point expectations about future prices p *z={pz+1'· ..•Pr}; 
ii) For each and every 1 szsT, and for j= 1 , ... J+1, given prices Pz, industry j 
(including the investment good sector) maximizes the expected present value of the net cash flows 
subject to the equation of motion of capital stock. strictly convex adjustment costs. and point 
expectations about future prices p *z={pz+ 1 .··.'Pr}; 
-
I 

I 

i 
I 

~ 
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iii) For each and every 1$;z$;T, given ,prices PZ' the 9?vernm'ent maximizes the 
expected value of its intertemporal social preferences subject to a recursive set of budget 
constraints and point expectations about future prices p.z:;{pz+1"" ,PT}; 
iv) For each and every 1 $;z$;T, given prices PZ' the J+3 markets in the economy clear 
. . 

based on com~on expectations about future prices p Z' individua1 preference parameters¥i' 

technology parameters. corporate financing rules ¥j' and .on social welfare parameters and 

current and expected tax policy roles ¥g. The market clearing equations are: 

L iY0 ij ( P z ; P *z ; ¥ i) + y D I j ( P z ; P *·z ;¥ 1 )+ Y D j g z ( p z ; P *z ; ¥ 9 ) +L 1$; f$; ~y [)..fj z ( P z ; P *z ; ¥ f) 
/ 
/\ 
.(90) LjL0 j{pz;P*z;¥j)+L0 I(~Z;P'"z ;¥I)+LDg(pz;p * z ;¥g )=Li LS i(P;;P*z;¥i) 
(91) L jl TD j{Pz;p* z ;¥j)+ITD I{Pz;P*z;¥ 1)+1 D9 {Pz;p*z ;¥g)=IS (pz;p*z ;;¥ I) 
(92) 
This economy 5atisfies Walras's Law for each and every Z$;T and for all current prices, i.e., the 
value of market excess demand is zero. This economy is characterized by a system of J+3 equations 
equating excess demands to' zero in every market in J+3 unknown prices (J consumption goods, 
investment good, labor, and the interest rate). However. using Walras's Law, only J+2 equations 
are linearly independent, and therefore only relative prices can be obtained. Some sort of price 
normalization is necessary. In what follows, the prices are defined to be strictly positive and to 
sum up to one, i.e. they are defined in the unit simplex. 
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2.8 ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM: THE RULES OF F6RMATIO~OF EXPECTATIONS 
Overview of the Literature I 
Virtually all the dynamic CGE models for tax policy evaluation adopt the concept of perfect 
. . Iforesight equilibrium. An exception is Goulder (1985), who also assumes myopic expectations. In 

. turn, Ballard-Goulder (1985) consider a flexible amount of foresight in terms of the number of 
 I 
years over which price movements are foreseen. 

The model in this paper is flexible in a somewhat different way in th~t it can include any range 

. 
of foresight from myopia to perfect foresight. The choice between the perfect foresight and 

temporary equilibrium is ultimately to be made on philosophic grounds. It can be argued that less 

than perfect expectations imply that agents are irrational in some way (see Auerbach-Kotlikoff 

. (1987) p. 10). However, the reverse argument can be made: one can question whether agents are 

. . / 
\ /
. . . really rational and perfectly knowledgeable about future pricos. 
. , 
. . 
Recent evidence of Ballard (1987), Ballard-Goulder (1985), and Goulder (1985), confirmed 
by this work, suggests that the choice in modeling expectations is an important one. They show that 
. 
- ,the degree of foresight into the future (ranging from perfect foresight to myopic expectations) may 
h~ve dramatic impacts on the policy conclusions of the model. Accordingly, the best research 
strategy may be to design models which are flexible enough to allow for different rules regarding 
the formation of expectations. 
In terms of implementation, the two concepts of equilibrium - perfect foresight and temporary 
equilibrium - have different implications. The dimensionality of the equilibrium solution 
algorithm is involved. Suppose we have a model with ten markets to be run for a period of 50 
years. Aside from normalization, a perfect foresight model implies computing prices in 500 
dimensions. Due to the absence of the requirement of intertemporally consistent action plans, a 
temporary equilibrium model requires solving 50 sequential equilibria, each in ten dimensions. 
The link between adjacent periods is endogenously provided by the recursive transitions of the 
....... 
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stock variables in the economy! Given that computational speed often varies witb the cube of the 
, . 
number of dimensions, the temporary equilibrium formulation is potentially and strikingly more. 
feasible. However, Ballard (1987) and Goulder-Ballard (19aS) have developed techniques to 
greally speed the computation of a perfect foresight equilibrium. 
The DAGEM Model 
The information set at period t reflects what is known about trye economy at 1. It consists of all 
. . 
the structural information of individual preferences and technologies, and atl the past equilibrium 
. .. 
prices and quantities. Individual expectations at t, for all t+1. .. T, are based on information as 
specified in the information set. Price expectations are formed as Hicksian point expectations 
according to rules to be specified below. I~ each simulation of the intertemporal !podel, the agents 
/' 
maintain an intertemporarly· consistent rule of formation of poi"t price expectations. Therefore, 
- ~ ! 
the' possibility of the expectation for~alion" rules ~hanging thr:oughout time· is ruled out. However, 
the price expectations are updated when new information' comes into the information set. For 
. example, the expectations. of prices at t+h formulated at t and tT 1 will, in general, be different. 
, . 
Finally, in terms of the the information structure of the economy it is assumed that all the agents 
. have common price expectations. Therefore, the p~ssibility of informational asymmetries across 
agents is ruled out. 
The rules of formation of expectation are intended to capture the limitations of foresight into 
, the future, and are therefore reasonably simple. In particular, the following three simplifying 
assumptions are made on the expectational price process. 
Assumption 2,1: Bounded rationality - Price expectations depend only on past realized prices, 
not other variables in 1St- This assumption can be interpreted as recognizing that information is 
costly to acquire and process, thus not all the information in 1St is used. 
.. ~ 
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This is a crucial assumption. The closed definition of the relevant information set excludes the 
possibility of the agents knowing, or at least using the knowledge "oj the .model of the economy, h~nce 
the bounded rationality nature of the assumption. At a deeper revel this ·assumption may be 
constru~d as revealing the source of uncertainty in t.his economy - if the agents knew the model of 
the economy they would be able to accurately forecast fufure prices. 
Assumption 2.2: Markov Assumption - The price process {Pt~ is "at most a second order Mar.kov 
process, i.e., only Pt, Pt-1 help to predict Pt+ l' Thus for all t: . 
Assumption 2.3: Stationarity - The parameters of the price process are time-invariant. For 
e'ach simulation of the model to determine the equilibrium at each period, the agents will maintain 
. expectations according to a stationary process. Thus for all t: 
/ 
/ 
Several rules of formation of point price expectations satisfying the above ass,umptions will be 
considered. Let curren~ price (or interest rate) be pz. Agents will form expectations at z of prices 
h periods into the future, zP e z+ h' (the first subscript will be dropped whenever it is not 
ambiguous) under several alternative rules. These rules are as follows: 
i) S.1aliG Expectatjons: Current prices are expected -to prevail into the future. For all 
. ii) Extrapolative Expectations: Expectations about future prices reflect the expected 
changes in prices in previous periods. Extrapolative expectations are obtained according to the 
recursive rule for all h>O, 
( 97) pe z+h=pe z+ h-1 +0(pe z+ h_1-pez+h-2)' 
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\ 
iii) Constant Rate of Growth: The expectations about future prices reflect the idea that 
the rate of change in. current prices is expected to prevail. .Forecasts are given according to. the 
recursive rule for all h>O, 
Thus, 
iv) Adaptative Expectations: Expectations of future prices reflect current prices and 
~/ 
. . /
previ9us expectations, so that some adjustment is made for expectation errors and new information. 
• I 
The recursive rule is for all h>O, 
v) Auto-Regressiye Expectations of Order 2 - AR(2): Forecasts are given according to 
the recursive rule for all h>O, 
Notice that. if we set bz+h=O for all h, a1=1, and a2=O, (103)-(104) reduces to the static 
-'-expectations as in equation (96). Also, if bz+h=O for all h, a1 =1 +0, and a2=-0, (103)-(104) 
reduces to the extrapolative expectations in equations (97)-(98). In turn, if we se! bz+h=O fo~ 
all h, a1 =(pz/Pz-1)' and 32=0, (1 03)-{1 04) reduces to constant rate of growth expectations in 
\ 
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equations (99)-(100). Finally, if we set 0z+h=-0 z-1 pe z + h _ ~~ =1+0, and a2=0,t1 

(103)-( 104) reduces to adaptative expectations in equations. (101 )-(102). Therefore static 

~xpectations, extrapolative expectations, con-stant rate of growth expectations, and adaptative 

• E!.xpectations are special cases of the AR(2) expectation rule as in (103)-(104) above . 
. To calculate the short-run equilibrium resulting from the differ,ent expectations rules above, 
..,. . 
it is sufficient to replace in. the equilibrium expr.essions in section 2:7, the future price and 

interest rates according to the expectation rules outlined above. 
 I 
I 
CHAPTER 3 - MODEL IMPLEMENTATION AND POLICY EVALUATIQN 
This chapter deals with issues related to the implementation of the dynamic general 
.; . 
/ 
equilibrium model - DAGEM - described in Chapter 2. The implementation of this model involves 
\ ! 
the specification of a base case equi.librium, which is to be contrasted with the revised case 
- ." \ ­
equilibria resulting from different alternative policy scenarios. The link betweel1 the base case 
 i 
equilibriul)1 and the revised case equilibria is provided by. th.e concept of equal yield - the size of 
. 'government is kept ·constant in a meaningful way. The ranking among different equilibria is I 
., 
provided by scalar welfare indicators defined as potential compensation tests. This chapter is i 
torganized as follows: S~ction 3.1 prc,vides a complete description of the economy in terms of data 
. on ~he stock variables and the behavioral parameter values; Section 3.2 generalizes of the concept 
of equal yield in the presence of government deficits; Section 3.3 generalizes the compensation 
tests to a context of no future markets and expectations which are not self-fulfilling. Finally, the 
details of the computer implementation are discussed in Section 3.4. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
! 
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3.1 BASE CASE INTERTEMPQRAl EQUILIBRIUM 
Calibration 

CGE models are typically parameterized by the use of a calibration procedure: Some 

'parameters are exogenously given. However, some crucial parameters are determined in such a 

. 
way that the model replicates the data for a given base year. See Mansur-Whalley (1984) for an 
extensive discussion of this issue. 
Calibration in a dynamic context is often interpreted as requiring two c~nsistency properties. 
First, as a static property replication of a base year data is required. Second, as an fntertemporal 
req~irement the model is parameterized to simulate a balanced growth path when the base policy is 
maintained. This is the approach foliowed by Ballard (1983), Ballard-Goulder .,(1985), Goulder 
. 
(19~\5), and Goulder-Summers (1987). The two-requirement calibration/'strategy follows the 
practice of Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven,-Whalley (1985). It is very much in the spirit of the 
traditional deslgn of the comparison of alternative equilibria: ~omparison between a "steady-state 
,base case on -one hand, anq alternative paths including a transition period and a final steady-state on 
the other hand. 
There are several potential problems this two-requirement calibration in the context of 
dynamic models. The assumption of a steady-state growth path in the base case can be questioned. 
First, while steady-state is a possibility, it certainly is not the only meaningful solution to 
, dynamic models. Even in the case of a perfect foresight equilibrium, the model implies an 
.. e~uiJjbrium path which mayor may not involve balanced growth. The moder, not the modeler, 
should dictate the nature of the base case path. Second, in the context of a temporary equilibrium 
'path, a steady-state solution is not a likely model outcome. In fact, unless expectations are static, 
short-run behavior consistent with a steady-state evolution wiH, in general, not be generated. On 
the other hand, if static expectations are self-fulfilling we have in fact a perfect foresight model. 
Third, even the base year replication requirement may cause problems in the context of temporary 
"', ','" f 
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equilibrium. Any calibration parameter would be conditional on expectation rules, which is 
probably an undesirable feature. 
The arguments in favor of assuming a base case steady-state are based on the idea that the 
impaCt of policy changes can be observed most easily since all departures from the steady-state can 
. . 
be attributed to the alternative policy. On the other hand, the base case so defined as a steady-state 
is consistent with previous work in a "less dynamic" setting and therefore allows a common 
standard for comparing model results. At any rate, it seems fair to say that a balanced growth 
requirement is not necessary and may even be counterproductive, and the static requirement while 
desirable is not necessary either. 
The alternative approach of qualitative calibration has been use~ by authors like 
A~erbach-Kotlikoff (1983, 1984, 1987) and Bovenberg (1984, 1985, 1986). The structural 
parameters ar~ exogenou.sly chosen so that the economy follows a reasonabJ.tpath into the future . 
.\ / 
The strategy of qualitative calibration is also adopted in this paper.101 . First, qualitative 
.., \ 
calibration· is ideal to exploit the recursive nature of. the DAGEM: It minimizes the amount of 
informatio~ necessary to run the model. In fact, aside from the structural parameters, only initial 
'stock values are needed. Given initial conditions on the stocks of private wealth, capital, and 
government ·debt, agents optimize thereby generating a set of net demands and short-run 
ecuilibrium conditions. In turn, short-run equilibrium prices determine the evolution of the stock 
variables into the next period. Second, it allows comparisons' of different, not necessarily 
steady-state, equilibrium paths. As argued above, the model not the modeler should dictate the 
nature of the base case and revised case paths. 
pata Requirements and Parameter Specifjcation 
The current data set and the parameter specification of the DAGEM is essentially consistent 
with the 1973 data set and parameter specification of the recent version of Shoven·Whatfey's 
GEMTAP model as reported in Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985). The data set and 
, Ii .. 
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parameter specification was enl~rged to cover aspects not conside'red in the GEMT~P. See Tables 
1-3 for a detailed description of the data set and parameter specification in -the DAGEM. 
The implementation of the model in this paper requires th~ specification of a data set which 
consists of. the initial values of the. stock variables in, the economy. The capital .stocks for the 
different industries in the model are obtained from Ballard-Fullerton-St)oven-Whalley (1985) by 
applying an average after-tax ra~e of return to capital income. In~ustry specific debt and equity. 
are obtained by applying the debt/capital ratios reported in Fullerton-Gordon (1983) to the 
capital stocks figures. The figure for government capitar stock i~ based on the work of J i 
IBoskin-Robinson-Roberts (1986) 
--
translated into 1973 numbers. Public debt is specified to. I 
I, 
reflect its current importance in the economy. The 1983 values of debt per capita and the ~ i 
prop<?rtion of debt to GNP are applied to the 1973 figures as reported in Ballard-Fullerton­
~ I
/ 
Shaven-Whalley (1985). Since the formulation of the model assumes the existence of a market 1 
! i 
financial portfolio with individuals alloeating savings by buying shares of the market portfolio~ it I ~ ." \ . 

is enough to determine the composition of ownership of global wealth in the economy by income 
 I 
class. This. data is obtained from the Office of Tax Planning as reported in Galper-Lucke-Toder I 
I
.(1 ~86). Tne number of households in each income class is as reported in Ballard-Fullerton­
Shoven-Whalley (1985). 
1 
Running the model requires the specification of functional forms and parameter selection. For I 
tractability, linear homogeneous Cobb-Doug/as functional forms are chosen for all the utility and 
production functions in the current implementation of the mode/. Individual preference, I 
- government, and technology share parameter values, and the input/output structure are obtained 
I 
from Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985) and correspond to 1973 values. Quadratic 
". adjustment cost functions are postulated. The value of the adjustment cost parameters is consistent I I 
j 
with the values reported in Summers (1981) and Goulder-Summers (1987). Finally, the private I 
1 
-
capital depreciation rates are from Fullerton-Gordon (1983), and public capital depreciation rate ·1 
are from Boskin-Robinson-Roberts (1986). I 
1 
, 
\ 
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Corporate financial rules are constant industry specific debt/equity ratios obtained from 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983) and the constant i'ndustry specific retention/dividend ratios are obtained 
from the Survey of Current Business (1983). 
-Tax parameters ~nder the previous tax regime reflect sector specific labor taxes, corporate tax I 
rates, investment tax· credits, and capital depreCiation rates for 'tax purposes as reported by I 
Fullerton-Gordon (1983). Marginal personal income taxes are 'those in Ballard-Fullerton- I 
'Shoven-Whalley (1985), and capital gains taxes are set at 50/0 as in Goulder-Summers (1987). 
1 
l 
3.2 BEVISED CASE INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM 
IThe link between the base case equilibrium and the revised case equilibrium obtained from 
'I 
different policy changes is provided by the concept of equal yield; government generated public 
-
I
. . .I'
.\ ! I. utility is kept constant. The first ~ubsection generalizes the concept of equal yield to a context in 
I 
I 
which the. government is allowed to run deficits. The second subsection specifies government dual 
behavior according to the minimization of the discretionary expenqiture necessary to finance a i 
I 
\ given path of intertemporal public utility. Finally, the third subsection describes the different i 
I 
I 
methods of ~ax replacement used to make up for changes in g~vernment tax revenues induced by the 
policy changes under the different equal yield scenarios. 
EQual Yield Alternatiyes and Government Defici~ 
The policy evaluation of tax changes is based on comparisons between a base case equilibrium 
which represents the status quo and a series of revised case equilibria which reflect the tax policy 
changes under discussion. The link between a base case and counterfactual simulations is usually 
provided by the concept of equal yield: to be comparable, base and revised equilibrium cases should 
be such that the size of government is kept constant in a meaningful way. 
Shoven-Whalley (1977) provide a detailed discussion of the concept of equal yield in a general 
, 

48 Iequilibrium context. When government is confined to taxation and discretionary transfers, equal 
yield is interpreted to mean equal tax revenues. On the other hand, when government activities 
. I 
include purchases of private goods in addition to taxation and discretionary transfers, equal yield is 
interpreted to mean constant public utility . In this 'case, government base case utility is 
.m~intained in the counterfactual experiments. 
In this paper equal yield is also ass,umed to mean equal government public utility in both the 
base and" revised case equilibria. The intertemporal sequence of govern!l1ent cumulative utility 
{Fgtb ".",FgTb} is retrieved from the base case. For the revised case, gov.ernment purchases of 
commodities wi 1.1 be such that at revised equilibrium prices, the base case sequence of utilities is 
attained at minimum cost. Thus government behavior is consistent with compensated demand 
f~nctions for base case utility levels.11 / . 
. . / 
.Running a revised case requires changes in the equilibrium condi,tfons and the optimal 
transitions for ,the stock variables.,' ~irst, the equilibrium conditions include government 
compensated demand functions as in the next subsection and Appendix VI, rather than'the ordinary 
, demand functions as in Section 2.5 and Appendix IV. Second, the government expenditure function 
!n "its budget constraints also reflects the compensated demands. Accordingly, the revised case 
transition for government liabilities can be written as 
In Shoven-Whalley (1977), government is subject to a balanced budget constraint. With 
balanced budgets, the concept of equal yield is unambiguous. The new equilibrium prices and the 
balanced budget condition will determine the minimal expenditure and taxes needed to maintain base 
case public utility. Revised case tax revenues just match revised case minimum expenditures. 
Accordingly, in general, equal yield is inconsistent with equal nominal tax revenue. Some change in 
tax revenue is necessary. Different tax replacement schemes are considered to aS$ure that enough 
tax revenue is collected. 
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In the DAGEM, because government is allowed to run deficits, the concept of equal yield tax 
replacement needs to be refined. If tax revenue·s are kept equal to new expenditures, the 
government supply of bonds is changed which introduces marginal financial crowding-out effects . 
. Also, by keeping either revenues or debt constant" there is still one degree-of-freedom since 
additional expenditures plus discretionary transfers and interest payment on debt, may be financed 
. . 
via tax revenues, bond issuance, or both. Consequently there are several possible equal yield ways 
of computing 'a replacement tax rate in the revised case. The optimal level of expenditure for base 
case public utility can now be tax financed, bond financed or, financed by a mix of bonds and taxation. 
Some measure of financial crowding-out effects of government deficits can be inferred from the 
comparison of the several equal yield alternatives. 
The following three cases are considered. 
1) tax financed policy change 
/ 
! 
In this alternative, equal yield is defined as the same utility levers and same deficits. The size 
I, 
of the deficits is kept as in the base ·case. A tax rate is endogenously changed such that tax revenues 
. make up for the expenditure net of _deficit financing. ~orm~ny, this adds to the model the following 
-	 constraints: 
2) bond financed policy change 
This equal yield alternative implies the same government utility and same tax revenues. It 
, 	 should be emphasized that unlike Shoven-WhaIley (1977) equal yield is now consistent with equal 
tax revenue. Tax revenues are kept constant at base case levers. For different equilibrium prices, 
the same tax revenue implies endogenous changes in tax rates. Adjustment to deficits, and 
therefore bond issuance, makes up the difference between tax revenue net of transfers, interest 
payment on the debt, and the minimizing expenditure to achieve base case utilities. Formally, this 
. . 
\ 
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adds to the model the following constraints: 
3) same compositiQn Qf expenditure financing 
This equal yield aternative implies the same governm~nt utility and the same bQnd-tax revenue 
financing mix as in the base case. Formally: 
-
(111) {1 +[TT tb/ABgtbr1 }TT {{IT)= 
bPLtLgt{Fgtb) + LjPjtYgjt{Fgt ) +P 1t1gt{Fgtb)+rtBgt+Trt· 
"'" The comparison among these equal yield schemes is central to tax polic~ evaluation in the 
I 
/
presence of government deficits. The three schemes differ in the marginal, financial crowding out 
. , 
they generate. T"ax financed change blocks marginal finanCial crowding out by keeping debt at base 
case levels. Bond financed equat yield .maximize marginal financial crowding-out effects by keeping 
bas~ case tax revenues constant and by allowing deficits to make up the necessary adjustments. Case 
3_ reflects an intermediate situation. 
Minimization Qf Government DiscretiQnary Expenditure 
As discussed above, the concept of equal yield alternatives supposes that government in the 
revised cases maintains the same level of social utility as in the base case. GQvernment acts as to 
minimize the discretionary expenditure necessary to finance a given path of intertemporal public 
utility. 
Public utility at every t is given by a log linear Cobb-Douglas function such that social felicity 
at z can be written as 
t 
. I 
I 

f 
l 
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The dual optimization problem for government can be written as: 
, 
1( 11 3) Min 2.z~t~T[nz~sst( 1+rsr ][2.jPjtYgjt+ (1 +i 9Lt)PLt L~t+p Itlgt-TT t+ Tr t+ r tLG.g!] 
subject to: 
i) non-negativity constraints on control? for all zstsT 
( 1 1 4) Yit~O for all 1 SjsJ, Lit~ 0 
ii) eguation of motion for the state variable capital stock for all zstsT 
iii) end constraints on the capital stock 

* 
( 1 1 6) Kgz=K 9 
iv) eguation of motion of state yariable public felicity for an- zst~T 
y) end conditions. for ~bcial\ felicity 
- * 
. (11 8) F gz=F 9 
The Hamiltonian associated to this problem is for all zstsT 
{[2.jPjtYgjt+(1 + T gLt)PLtLgt+Pltlgt)-TTt+Trt+rtLGgtl+ 
(1 +rt+ 1r 1qgt+ 1 [(1 +dg ) F gt-(1 +dgHLjagj Ln (y gjt)+ag L Ln (Lgt)+ag K Ln (Kgt)]]+ 
·+(1 +rt+1 r 1qgkt+1 [lgt+(1-0gt)Kgt]) 
According to the Maximum Principle, the necessary conditions for optimality at tare: 
i) eQuation of motion for the state yariable felicity for all zst~T-1 
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ii) felicity 	end conditions 
iii) adjoint· eQuatjon for the marginal cost of utility for all z~t~T 
iv) eQuation of motion for capital for all z~t~T 
v) capital stock initial condition 

* 

. (.1 26) Kgz=K 9 
vi) adjoint eQuation for the marginal cost of capital for all z~t~T / ... 
. / 
\ -1 / 
. '.( 1 2 7) 	q kg t=(1+ r t + 1 ) [q 9 k t + 1,(1 - 0 9 t) -q 9 t + 1 (1 +ag) a g K ( 11K 9t)} 
vi.i) Hamiltonian yariational conditions for control variables for all zst~T 
(1 29) (1 +d9 ) ( 1+ r t + 1 ) -1 q 9 t + 1a 9 i Lg t =(1+ T 9 L t ) p L t 
( 1 30) P It+ (1 + r t + 1r 1 q 9 k t + 1= 0 
Closed form solutions are derived in Appendix VI. It suffices to say here that whenever revised 
case equilibria are to be computed, the government compensated demand functions should replace 
the government primal demand functions used in the computation of base case equilibria as 
. discussed in Chapter 2.6 and described in Appendix V. 
Tax Replacement Schemes 
The equal yield alternatives discussed above involve endogenous replacement changes in the tax 
rates. Different tax replacement schemes are considered to assure that enough tax revenue is 
.. ·'····1 
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collected. Tax replacements involve changes in the personal i(lcome tax rates. The personal income 
tax' collected from individual i at time t is, in the revised case: ~ 
(131) bit +[a ITit+bHTaxable Income)+LSTit 
where a is a multiplicative change factor, b is an additive change factor, and LSTit is a lump sum 
, tax levied on individual i at time t. This lump-sum tax corresponds to a fraction of the total 
endogenous tax revenue change equal to the i-th household share in total wealth. 
The three replacement schemes are obtained as follows: 
1) multiplicative replacement - set b=LST =0 and let a be endoge~ously determined; 
2) additive replacement - sat a=1, LST =0, and let b be endogenously determined; 
3) lump sum replacement - set a=1, b=O, and let LSTit be endogenously determined. 
In general, not all possible replacements schemes are feasible. Thet~~ oase that provides the 
. , / 
additional revenues to match the tax revenues foregone by the, policy changes has got to be important 
. 
enough to generate the necessary'reJenues; . Otherwise, counterfactual equilibrium may fail to 
exist {see Shoven-Whalley (1977) on this issue}. 
The, three replacement schemes suggested here seem plausible on a priori ground~. Using the 
personal income tax as the base for the tax replacement in the context of corporate tax integration 
is conceptually appropriate in the light of the concept of "double taxation." Also, personal income 
tax as the base for the tax replacement in the context of corporate tax integration seems to 
minimize the likelihood of non-existence in that corporate tax revenues were about 8% of total tax 
revenues in 1985, while personal income tax revenues accounted for 46% • 
3.3 POUCYEVALUATION INDICATORS 
This section deals with the question of how to perform policy evaluations in the context Q.f the 
DAGEM model. In the first subsection, the use of compensation tests is discussed. In the second 
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subsection, the concept of compensation test is generalized in a context of no f~ture markets and of 
fnon-self-fulfilling expectations. Finally the third subsection dE:}rives the policy evaluation 
indic~tors in the specific context of the DAGEM model. 
On the Use of Compensation Tests 
The ultimate goal of CGE a~alysis is to rank different policy alternatives according to some 
criterion reflecting. desirability for society. There are several ways of associating a scalar welfare 
measure to the array of information which defines an economiC equilibrium. The most general way 
, is to follow an axiomatic approach. Several ethically desirable postulates on the' space of social 
stat~s would be established and a social welfare function over the domain of individual utilities 
deriv~d accordingly. There are serious difficulties with such an approach. First, a general 
"'" / . 
"impossibility theoJem" for social welfare functions rules out the existence of such functions under 
\ ! 
a reasonable set of axioms (see Arrow (~963)). Second, even if we assume enough to guarantee the 
..... " 
existence of a social welfare function, the specific functional form inevitably repre~ents highly 
subjective val~es which will have an undue influence on the we.lfa~e conclusions to be drawn . 
. ~n alternative approach is to measure the actual benefits of policy changes by a Pareto 
-
superiority criterion. The most immediate drawback of this criterion is that it does not provide a . 
complete ranking of the different social states of the economy. However, this problem can be 
overco~e by the use of a potential benefit criteria, first suggested by Kaldor (1939). These 
, criteria are based on the ability of winners to compensate the losers and still benefit from a certain 
. -policy change, even if such compensation does not actually take place. 
Compensation tests in the form of aggregated Hicksian Equivalent Variations and aggregated 
. ··Hicksian Compensated Variations (see Hicks 1940) are the most prevalent criteria to ·measure 
efficiency gains or losses in the CGE literature. The Compensated Variation (CV) measures at 
revised case prices the maximum amount of money the consumer is willing to payor requires to' 
receive to return to his base case utility. Positive CV's are to be interpreted as representing 
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welfare gains. The Equivalent Variation (EV) measures at base case prices the maximum amount of 
money the consumer is willing to receive or pay to attain the r~viseq case utility level. Pos,itive 
EV's are to be interpreted as representing welfare gains. These individual compensation EV's and 
C.V·s are, constructed by using optimal cost functions. Therefore they are "objective" money metric 
indicators. Aggregation of compensation indicators across individuals does. not pose any particular 
problem. 
For empirical use, the concept of CV is useful to compare the status quo to one alternative 
policy. However, since the reference prices change with. the alternative e~periment, CV cannot be 
meaningfully used in multiple comparisons. That is exactly the comparative adVantage of EV which 
always uses the status quo prices as reference. 
Expectations, Optimal Intertemporal Expenditure, and Compensation TestS 
, . I 
/ 
The construction of compens~tion indicators from individual optimal cost functions .in an 
intertemporal framework deserves some attention. Consider a consumer in an intertemporal 
framework. In general, the optimal intertemporal cost function associated with. a certain path of 
-
utility depends on all present and future prices. If all future markets are open, or if future prices 
are, perfectly anticipated - the case discussed by Pollak (1975) - there are no problems with the 
interpretation and use of the intertemporal cost function and "a fortiori" with the computation of 
intertemporal EV and C\i indicators. Also, in a CGE context, when comparisons are confined to 
steady-state and/or perfect foresight is assumed that correct future prices are known and there are 
no difficulties associated with the use of the standard Hicksian indicators. 
When some future markets are not open and/or future prices and interest rates are not 
perfectly anticipated, the concept of intertemporal cost function and associated policy evaluation 
indicators needs some refinements. Denton (1982) develops the notion of anticipated cost function 
to reflect expected long-run cost of utility. He also develops the idea of annuity costs associated 
with a constant flow of utility. 
\. 
. 
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From the standpoint of meaningful empirical applications Denton's indicators are less than 
ideal. The true compensation indices must be baseo on ex-post, one-period, optimal cost function 
parametric on future price expectations, and not on an ex-ante anticipated cost function which is, 
in general, not self-fulfilling. Also, the true intertemporal compensation indices must be based on 
a ,consistent sequence of one-period, ex-post, optimal cost fun~tions associated with a certain 
utility path. This will, in general" involve non-constant utility annuities. The basic concepts used 
in this subsection to build the true compensation indices are: anticipate~ cost function, and 
short-run and long-run realized cost functions. Let us be more formal. 
Consider a 'sequential economy like in DAGEM, starting at z, lasting T periods, and evolving' 
according to a temporary Walrasian structure. Consider af~o two different (i-z}-dimensional 
. , equilibrium trajectories for an economy associated with different poricy specifications: 'a base case 
. ~ 
,,/ 
equlUbrium with prices { ... ,Ptb, ... } and associated price expectations { ... ,Pt7b ,•..}; and a revised 
I • 
case equilibrium with prices { ... ,prt,....}· an~ associated price expectations { ••. ,Pter, ... }. In both 
base and revised cases, the sequence of primal problems for the household induces a one-period 
. * * * 
util.ity sequence {U z, ... ,U t, ... ,U T}' This utility sequence generates a decreasing sequence of 
* * 1 * programming algorithm, F't=U t+(1 +dir F t+1. From the perspective of dual household 
</0 * .. * behavior, there is a sequence of one-period cost functions {SRC z (F z},.··, SRC t( F t) 
with the primal felicity sequence. In turn, the one-period cost functions generates a sequence of 
dynamic programming algorithm C t=SRCFt+(1+rtf C t+1' Now, we want to compare from the 
* * * * * * cumulative future costs {C z(F z},···,C t(pz'Pz+ 1 ,···,PT;F z}, ...,e T(F T)} through a recursive 
* 1 * 
point of view of the i-th household the two equilibrium sequences both in the short run and in the 
\ 	
..., 
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long run. 
If the i-th consumer correctly anticipates all future prices in botb the base and revised cases, Ithen all the plans into the future will be implemented witho~t the need for revisions. In such a 
* * case; F z(.) is the a~tual intertemporal optimal felicity function at z. In turn, C z(') is the actual 
intertemporal optim~1 cost function at z. The construction of intertemporal 'compensation tests is, 
in this context, a straightforward generalization of the static case. 
However, If at z the i-th consumer cannot perfectly anticipate futur~ prices, then Pz+ 1 , ...,PT 
are to be interpreted as price expectations, pe z+1 , ... ,peT and not as actual prices. Furthermore, 
since expectations are not fulfilled, intertemporal primal and dual plans will be revised according 
. to a sequence of optimization problems. At each z only current plans parametric on the expectation­
* of future prices are actually implemented. Also, only current utility U z/ and associated current. 
_\ / 
'* t * * 
optimal cost SRC z are actually reB:lize,d. Accordingly, the optimal functions F z(.) and C z(.) are 
, 	 , ' \ 
to be inte'rpreted"as the long-run anticipated optimal 	feli~ity function and long .. run anticipated 
* ­
optimal cost functions, at z, respectively. Since C z (.) reflects current costs and future 
anticipated costs of obtaining a certain expected utility path level, as opposed to actual costs of 
financing an actual utility path, it should be rewritten as Cez(.): 
Now, (132) may be used to generate indicators of the long-run effects anticipated at z of a 
certain policy change. 
, i) anticipated long run EV at z 
ii) anticipated long run cy at z 
( 1 3 4) EVe -Ce (r er er 'Fb ) Ce (r er er .r )z- z p z,p z+1'''''P T' z - iz P ZIP z+1""'P 	 T' z . 
\ 
J 
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Inasmuch as consumers do not anticipate correctly future prices, the anticipated indicators are 
of no help to evaluate either the actual short-run e,ffects at z or the actual long-run effects of the 
alternative policies. The relevant concept for short-run policy evaluation is the re alized 
short-run cost function at z, which gives current realized costs at z as a function of current prices 
, . 
.as well as future price expectations and a given level of felicity: 
The following are the associated short-run eyaluation indicators: 
iv) realized short-run ey at z 
v) realized short-run" CV at z 
.\ / 
Let us now focus on the long-run evaluation indicators. The problem with obtaining such 
\ 
long-run indicators is to get a meaningful sequence of short-run indicators which are, comparable 
and consistept for aggregation. We need first to construct a meaningful sequence of short-run 
ap.ti'mal cost functions associated with an actual utility path, so that at each t the one-period costs 
. reflect current utility and are consistent with future observed felicity. 
The true ex-post intert~.mporal cost function over the period z to T, C~Z' corresponding to 
certain temporary equilibrium prices, future price expectations, and a given felicity sequence, is 
, the present discounted value of the sequence of realized short-run cost functions: 
* * (138) C z(Pz,Pz+1,···,PT;{F t})::: 
where rt and Pt are actual market prices and interest rates at t, and pet+h,s are expected values at 
t of prices at t+h. 
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To obtain the intertemporal evaluation indicatOrs, we jyst have to' use the long-run optimal 
cost function as described above, 
vii) IntertemporalEV at z 
Lz~t~T[nz~s~t(1 +,bs)-1 ][SREVt(pbt;pebt+ 1 "",pebT;Fbt,F't)] 
viii) Intertemporat CY at z 
C • (r r , '{Fb}) c* (r r r '{F')­z P z,p z+1 , ... ,p T' t - z p. z,P z+t,,··,P·T' t­
Lzst~T[nz~sst(1 +rrs)-1}[SRCVt(prt;pert+ 1 , .. "perT ;Fbt,~~t)1 
/ 
.I 
. 
Intertemporal Compensation Indicat6rs in the pAGEM 
.... 
As discussed above, the construction of compensation tests requires individual short-run and 
- ,Iong-ru~ optimal cost -functions. At z the dual problem for each consumer Qroup i, the 
minimization of intertemporal net costs subject to a sequence of future felicity can be written as 
subject to: 
i) noD-negativity constraints on controls for all 2StsT 
* ( 1 4 2) Yit~O for all 1sj~J, OSLitS L i 
ii) eQuation of motioo for state variable felicity for all zstsT 
\ 
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iii) state end conditions 
• . *' 
.. 
(144) FZ=F i 
The Hamiltonian associated to our problem is for z:5;t:5;T 
(146) H t ( L i ' Yi' V.J i' q i) = nz:5; sst ( 1 + r s ) - 1{L j ( 1 + T j t) p j t Y ij t- ( 1-Tit) . I 
I
, 
The necesSary conditions for optimality at z derived from the Maximum Principle are: I 
I 
,i) eQuation of motion for the state varjable feliCity for all Z:5;t:5;T ~ 
.. ,,/ 
~ 147) Ft+1 =(1 +dj)F. t-(1 +dj)[Lja ij Ln(Yjjt)+(1-Lja ij)Ln(L i-Lit~}' 
t 
ii) state end conditions r 
.. (148) Fiz=F i 
~ 
1 
Iiii) adjoint eQuation for the co-state variable marginal cost of utility for all Z:5;t:5;T 
.. I 
Iiv) Hamiltonjan varjational conditions for control variables for all zstsT I 
i 
1 
I 
This problem is solved in Appendix VII. It suffices to report here the optimal short-run cost 
function at z reflecting contemporaneous expenditure in consumption goods and leisure. 
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[Lj a ijLn[aij/(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1-Ljaij),Ln[(1-Ljaij)/(1-Tit)PLt1 + 
Ln [( 1+djr(t-z)n z+ 1ssst( 1+r s)]]}/[LzstST( 1+dir(t-z)]} 
The intertemporal minimization problem is to be repeated each period to allow for revisions 
of optimal plans due" to unfulfilled expectations. rhen, the sequence of optimizatiDn problems 
, induces a sequence of actual short-run cost functions {SRCFiz,SRCFiz+1 ..... SRCFiT} and cumulative 
.. 
.... .. 
interternporal cost realizations {C iz'C iz+ 1""'C iT } consistent with the. actual felicity sequence 
{Fiz.Fiz+ 1 , ... ,FiT}· The aggregate short-run and long-run compensation indicators are reported 
in Appendix VIII. 
- 3.4 CQMPlITATION TeCHNIQUES 
/ 
.\ I 
Overview of the Literature 

The development of dynamic models - in particular with adjustment costs" and/or perfect 

foresight.. has corresponded with the decline in the use of fixed point algorithms. In fact, given 
 I 
. the relative large dimensions inevitably involved, such algorithms tend to be very inefficient at the' I 
best and often prohibitively slow. See Stone (1985) and' Preckel (1985) for a comparative I 
assessment of different ~omputation techniques. Among the recent dynamiC general equilibrium 
models for tax policy evaluation, only Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985) and Feltenstein I
i 
(1985) use Merrill's variant of the fixed point algorithm technique (see Merrill (1972». 
Auerbach-Kotfikoff (1983, 1984, 1987) follOW a three-stage procedure. They first compute 
a base case steady-state, then a revised case steady-state. and finally a transition path for the 
economy between these two steady-states. In all stages, a Gauss-Seidel iterative procedure is used. 
Ballard (1982), Ballard-Goulder (1985). Goulder (1985). and Goulder-Summers (1987) 
use a method developed by Ballard and Goulder which is similar in many aspects to the Fair-Taylor 
" 
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. 	 (1983). algorithm. Short-run equilibria are calculated (using MerrHl's algorithm) 
parametrically on price' expectations. The model is then iterated to generate self-fulfilling . 
intertemporal expectations and the corresponding perfect foresight equiliprium. In a relatively 
similar apptoach, Andersson (1987) uses a simulation program, SIMNON, developed at the 
University of Lund. This program can handle two-point boundary problems in -a fashion consistent 
with the multiple shooting algorithm (see Lipton-Poterba-Sachs-Summers (1982». I 
lBovenberg's computational approach (1985, 1986) differs frotn. other .models in that he relies 
heavily on analytical techniques. Computations are do~e by using a dynamic versi?n of Johanson's 
. linearization method. Being essentially determined by the' continuous-time nature of the model, I 
this linearization model has the disadvantage of confining the analysis to infinitesimal changes 

around the base case equilibrium (see Bov!3nberg (1985) p. _53). 

rrlich-Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987) follow a unique approach t~ that the~/use a variant of the 

optimization technique introduced by ~egis~i (1969). The economic equilibrium can be generated 

as a solution of a mathematical program, the objective function of which is a weighted sum of the 
. utility functions of the vari~us agents, while the constrai~ts set ~onsists of the market clearing 
, 	 I I 
Iconditions. Ginsburgh-Heyden (1985) have extended Negishi's result to the case of downward 
',f 
price rigidities. 
. ·1 
Finally, the paper by JQrgenson-Yun (1984) is also unique in that it is, among the recent 
dynamic general equilibrium models for tax policy evaluation, the only econometrically estimated 
, model. Different blocks for the consumption and production side of the model are separately 
, . e,stimated to provide the necessary structural parameters. 
'The diversity of computation techniques is yet another i~dicator of the exploratory nature of 
'" the dynamic CGE modeling for tax policy evaluation. 
The DAGEM Model 

Given the temporary equilibrium structure of the DAGEM, the computation of at-dimensional 
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'intertemporal equilibrium path involves the computation of a sequence P~ t, one-shot, short-run 
equilibria parametrically on price expectations. The model is typ~ally run to produce a twen.ty­
year equilibrium sequence in a decision time frame of' one hundred years.121 The optimal 
transitions of the stock variables between adjacent short-run equilibria are determined 
• M 
endogenously given the equilibrium prices and net demands. 
Each ~>ne-shot equilibrium is computed using NPSOL, an optimization algorithm developed by 
GilI-M.urray-Saunders-Wright (1986). The equilibrium ·conditions are seen as nonlinear 
equalily constraints in the minimization of 'an articifial objective function. The prices are 
normalized .to the unit simplex by an additional linear equality constraint.' The algorithm computes 
an equilibrium by finding a feasible point to this "bogus" minimization problem: by definition a 
. feasible point satisfies the constraints of the problem, in this case the equilibrium conditions. 
/ 
The DAGEM is implemented using' an interactive FORTRAN program JUnning on a IBM 4381. 
/ 
.\ I 
. The computation program is composed of several complementary segments: 
Segment 1 
Prompts the user to state the number of equilibria to be computed, expectations rules, and the 
- ,type of. run, whether a base case or a revised case, and if the latter what type of equal yield revised 
case; 
Segment 2 
Reads from a common block all structural information: number of consumers, number of 
producers; reads from an input data file the initial values for stock variables and preference and 
technology parameters as well as tax parameters. 
Segment 3 
Describes the equilibrium conditions for both base case and revised cases, including the codes 
for the net demand functions derived from the specification of the production side, consumption 
side, and government behavior. 
I 
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Segment 4 
Provides the i'!terface with the NPSOL subroutine. It solves for the one-shot, short-run . 

equilibriu.m prices. The computatio~ routine goes through T-z one-period loops, one for the 

computation of each temporary equilibria. The transition· between two consecutive loops includes 

. information from the current equilibrium to generate new initial conditions for the computation 
of the next equilibrium. 

Segment 5 

The last step in the main computer program presents the equilibrium results and other final 

information: equilibrium prices and corresponding aggregate and individual net demands for each 

and every tST; the transitions; individual utility and we~lth; the net cash flow.and capital stock 

. for each sector; the evaluation indicators and GNP, both for each and every tST, and 
/cumulatively.13/ / 
.\ I 
I 
. As a closing remark it should be said that the NPSOL algorithm pr.oved to be extremely efficient 
~ t "', \ 
for the computation of the economic equilibrium for such a .relatively com'plex model as ,the DAGEM. 

In fact it ta~es generally about one minute of terminal time on an IBM 4381 to compute a 

on.a-period equilibrium for an economy with eight markets and a time horizon of one-hundred 

. periods. For the same specification of DAGEM, Merril's version .of the fixed point algorithm takes 

abou', eight minutes. 

CHAPTER 4 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
4.1 SUMMARY 
This paper has developed a dynamic sequential general equilibrium model of the United States 

economy - DAGEM - with endogenous government deficits, forward looking investment decisions, 

and several financial assets. Given the model set up, the second step has been the discussion of 

\ 
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problems of implementation and policy analysis with such a. model. . The model has been 
implemented using a nonlinear. optimization -algorithm, NPSOL. 
The following is a summary of the results and contributions brought forth by this paper in 
terms of dynamic general equilibrium modeling, model implementation and policy evaluation. 
. ~ 
Dynafllic General Equilibrium Modeling 
T~is paper develops a stylized' dynamic general equilibrium model of the U.S. economy ­
. 	 DAGE~. Economic behavior of every agent' in this economy is derived from an intertemporal 
specificatio~ of the agent's objectives and constraints. Firms maximize the present ~~Iue.of the net 
cash flow in. an adjustment costs technology in order to determine endogenously optimal supplies 
. and optimal demands for the different production inputs. In particular, investment decisions are" 
"" 
. forward looking. Real investment is financed by retained earnings ?nd is~.uance of new debt and 
/ 
/
"equity according to exogenously defined rules. Government intertemporal behavior is obtainE!d 
. 
. \ 
from the maximization of a social' welfare function defined over the. domain of a public good and 
subject to. an intertemporal budget constraint.· The government is allowed to run deficits which are 
,financed by issuing bonds. Optimal household behavior follows a life-cycle. type of model 
generating endogenous savings and labor-leisure decisions. Household asset portfolio decisions 
merely accommodate the composition of demand for funds. Equilibrium in this economy is 
conceived as a temporary Walrasian equilibrium. All the markets, for several consumption goods, 
investment good, labor and financial funds, clear, hence the Walrasian' nature of equilibrium. Also, 
equilibrium in the short run is such that market clearing prices are parametriC on the expectation 
formation rules, hence the temporary nature of equilibrium. 
The model developed in this paper - DAGEM - is very much in the frontier of the computational 
general equilibrium modeling for tax policy evaluation. I would like to claim that with minor 
exceptions DAGEM provides an enlarged envelope of all the other dynamic CGE models avaiJable-Csee 
page 19 for a complete reference list and Pereira-Shoven (1987) for details~. 
-~- ..... 
\. 
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Comparable models were simultaneously dev~loped by· Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1976) and 
. 
Goulder-Summers (1.987). In terms of private ind!vidual behavior, only r:ninimal differences can 

be found .among DAGEM, Auerbach-Kotlikoff (AK), and GouJder:-Summers (GS). In the three 

models, dynamic production behavior is induced by the exi~tence of ~djustment cO,sts. In the three 

. . 
models, dynamic household behavior is characterized by a life-!=ycle type of structure. AK go 

further to consider a number of overlapping generations, which however' are collapsed into a single 

consumer.. DAGEM with six markets and three household income groups is mO're disaggregated than 

AK, which' has three markets and one aggregate consumer, and at is closer to the revel of 

. disaggregation of GS which has seven markets and one aggregate consumer. 

Marked differences among the three models are to .be f9und, first, in the· specification of 

• gevernment behavior. In GS, yearly balanced budgets are required. Expenditures are endogenous
. ~ 
. // 
but not optimal in that they merely accommodate to the level of tax revenues. In AK, the·· 
.\ / 
government is subject to an intertemp~r~1 9udget constraint. Therefore, government is allowed to 

run yearly deficits. However, the expenditure path is exogenously defined. Accordiogly, deficits 

,are endogenQusly but not optimally determined as a residual given tax revenues. In the DAGEM 

mo.del both government expenditures and government deficits are endogenously and optimally 

determined through the maximization of a public utility function and subject to a sequence of budget 

, 
constraints which are equival~nt to an intertemporal budget constraint as in AK. 
Differences are also to be found in the specification of financial markets. AK does not include 

, any private financial asset. In turn, DAGEM and GS share similar specifications of the financial 

. markets with a whole array of private financial .assets. 80th introduce firm-specific equity 

capital. In GS,' different assets earn different rates of return. However. such rates are equal up to 

. "'constant and exogenous sector-specific risk premia. DAGEM considers arso firm-specific bonds 
and is the only to consider exogenous debt-equity ratios and the possibility of investment being 
financed by either new bonds or new equity in addition to retained earnings. 
A third substantial difference is in the concept of equilibrium. Both AK and GS' follow a perfect 
." 1 
i 
t 
I 
t 
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foresight approach. In turn, DAGEM follows a temporar]! equilibrium. ~pproach with flexible 
expectation rules ranging from static expectations to any degree of foresight into the future. That.is 
important because evidence fostered by Ballard (1987) and Ballard-Goulder (1985) suggests that < 
empirical results tend to depend on the degree of foresi9ht. 
To summarize, the .DAGEM model remains unique among the CGE literature in the extent of 
dynamic b~havior" in the detailed consideration of financial assets, in that government deficits are 
optima~ly determined, and on the flexibility of expectation formation rule~. 
Model looplemeotatjon and Policy Evaluation 
In the context of applied general equilibrium analysis, policy evaluations are typically carried 
. 
. out by contrasting a base case reflecting the status quo and several counterfactual equilibria" 
.", 
< reflecting different scenarios generated by the policy changes unde( consiaeration. The different 
/ 

.\ I 

equilibria are made comparable by confining the comparison to equal yield alternatives. Finally, 
~, 
the information contained in the different equilibria is typically synthesized in a scalar indicator. 
In this paper the concept of equal yield is generalized to accommodate the existence of 
government deficits. In the counterfactual equilibria,. government is seen as minimizing 
intertemporal. expenditure associated with base case intertemporal "public utility." Equal yield is 
made consistent with tax financing changes in which bond issuance is kept at the base case level, or 
with bond financed chang'es in which tax revenues are kept at base case level, or any combination of 
the two. A measure of marginal financial crowding out induced by the policy changes may be 
- . 
inferred from comparing the different equal yield alternatives. 
The dynamic generalization of the Hicksian compensating variation indicators is made necessary 
by the absence of future markets and perfect foresight in the DAGEM. The generalization is 
obtained by aggregating the present discounted value of a sequence of actual short-run individual 
_cost functions. Alternative long-run anticipated, not actual, cost indicators were also developed. 
The DAGEM is implemented with a nonlinear optimization algorithm, NPSPL. The equilibrium 
I 
\ 
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conditions are interpreted as nonlinear constraints of an artificial optimizat!on problem. While 
alternative approaches were possible, this computation strategy. has two major advantages 
associated with the use of the NPSOL. First, NPSOL is an eX,tremely efficient algorithm. I estimate 
. . 
that for the size of the model in this work NPSOL is at least eight- to ten-times faster than 
-M~rrill'S fixed point algorithm. Second, this optimizatio.n approach h~s more flexibility than ~he 
standard techniques to solve systems of nonlinear eq.uations in that it allows the tr:eatment of 
market disequilib~ium and fixed price situations without further complications.' 
" 
4.2 CRITICAL ASSESSMENT Of THE CURRENT FORMULATION OfTHE DAGEM 
, 
At this point it is only fair to illustrate the principle that "what you get from a model is 
.,; 
/
directly related to what you. put into the model." There are two groups of factors that should be 
\ ! 
( 
taken into consideration when ev~luating whatever policies are under consideration. First, 
~ . . . " .. 
"minor" technical problems will be discussed. Second, two more fundamental concepttJal problems 
wili be addressed. 
Minor Technical Problems 
i) The Assumption of Additive Time-Separability of Preferences 
HOl:Jsehold preferences are assumed to be time separable in a strongly additive form. This is a 
standard assumption in the context of dynamic CGE analysis as well as in many other areas of 
. applied economics. Time separability is introduced mainly for the sa~e of analytiC simplicity. 
However, the assumption of additive time separability creates excessive intertemporal 
'. substitutability. 
ii) Restrictive Functional forms 
All the preferences and technologies are represented in the DAGEM by Cobb-Douglas type of 
functions. The specific empirical implications of this functional form are well known: fixed 
I 

I

• t 
j 
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expenditure shares; zero' cross price elasticities; unit incQme elasticities; unit elasticities of 
substitution" etc. The specific net demand functions derived from the intertemporal optimization 
. . .. . . 
problems are reported in Appendices II-IV. Other studies have used either Cobb-DQ,uglas or CES 
specific~tions. 
While it is, at this stage, conceptually straightforward to generalize the pAGEM to include more 
flexible functional forms, such a task is extremely time consuming. Accordingly, this route has not 
been pursued thus far. 
iii) Lack of AdeQuate Estimates of the Adjustment Cost parameters 
Several implementation of the DAGEM suggest that it takes time for the efficiency gains of 
specific poliCies to appear. This is in good part due to the adjustment cost specification. It reflects 
the adjustment lag in the interindustry investment decisions because of mobility and installation 
. costs of adjustment. Therefore, the parametrization of the adjustment cost functions assumes 
/ 
\ i 
. crucial relevance. There aren't many
. 
estimates of adjustment costs parameters available (see 
. 
Abel 
I 
. \ . (1980), Summers (1981), and Pindyck-Rotemberg (1983a, 1983b) for the few exceptions). 
am not aware of any estimates with the functional forms and disaggregation. as in this paper . 
. - .(Recall that the parameters used in this version of DAGEM are derived from the estimates in 
Summers (1981) which are obtained from different functional forms and disaggregation.) 
Accordingly, some effort should be developed to obtain more adequate estim:ltes.141 
Conceptual Problems 

i) Financial Behavior and Uncertainty 

In the pAGEM, real private investment is financed by retained earnings and issuance of new 
debt and equity according to exogenously defined corporate financing and dividend-retention rules. 
Government finances deficits by issuing bonds. Household asset portfolio decisions merely 
accommodate to the composition of demand for funds - private assets and public bonds. However, 
there are policies which should be expected to affect both the optimal portfolio decisions and the 
I 
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optimal corporate financial rules. and dividend-retention policies. I 
. . t 
Modeling uncertainty in a non-trivial way (recall that in the DAGEM uncertainty is 
"eliminated" by using. point expectations) seems to be the only. promising approach to meaningful 
treatment of both optimal financial decisions and optlmal household portfolio decisions. In a 
stochastic context, optimal portfolio decisions may be addressed within. a capital-assef-pricing­
model framework (see Merton (1970, 1973) for seminal work along .'these lines). Also, corporate. 
financial rules may be addressed by trading off the preference of debt against the potential 
bankruptcy costs of equity financing as in Fullerton-Gordon (1983). 
-
Despite the advantages of stochastic analysis, CGEmodeling and implementation in a stochastic 
setting is a very complex enterprise. It is not surprising that the first steps in this direction are 
still t9 be taken. 
/ii) The Closed-Economy Assumption / 
.I 
• I 
Most of the open economy CGE models follow the assumptions of balanced trade with import and 

. " 

export net demands characterized by constant elasticities along the lines of Ballard-Fullerton­
" , 
Shoven-Wha~ley (1985). Such is the case of Ballard (1983), Ballard-Goulder (1985), and 
Gqulder-Summers (1987). 
A few models have a different treatment of .the foreign sector. Feltenstein (1985) treats the 
rest of the world as an additional consumer group. Bovenberg (1986) develot.'ls a model in which 
two economies are considered, each following intertemporal perfect foresight paths. These 
economies meet in the international forum. Their trade relationships are characterized by yearly 
. balanced trade accounts . 
. None of the new generation of dynamic CGE tax models has yet fully incorporated the 
-'··international capital flows as done in Goulder-Shoven-Whalley (1983) on the earlier Ballard­
Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley (1985) model. The first attempts to incorporate the international 
capital flows are by Andersson (1987), and Erlich-Ginsburgh-Heyden (1987). Andersson 
(1987) in his mooel of the Swedish economy adopts a small-economy approach in which rates of 
'1 
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return in the domestic economy are largely determined by the internatiOrlal capital markets. Fixed 
interest rat~s induce international capital flows. The international capital flows determine and 
. . . 
finance the international trade imbalances. In turn, in Erlich-Gin~burgh-Heyden (~987), foreign 
trade is generated according to an intertemporal trade welfare function with constant import and 
export elasticities.' In the short run they allow international trade imbalances which generate 
.capital flows to the domestic households. In the long run, however, y~arly trade balance is assumed. 
It is fair to say that meaningful modeling of trade imbalances and international capital flows in the 
CGE literature is still in a preliminary stage. 
In its current formulation- the DAGEM is a closed-economy model - no foreign trade or capital 
flows are considered. This is an undesirable feature in terms of descriptive realism. 
- Furthermore, Goulder-Shoven-Whalley (1984) provide an extensive discussion of the importance 
.;I 
_of the modeling of the foreign sector for tax policy evaluation. In particul~Y, they conclude that in 
/ 

\ /

,the context of the Shoven-Whalley model the specification of the foreign sector substantially 
. . \ 
affects the results of several policy measures.' , 
The introduction of international capital flows in the DAGEM assumes spe~ial interest in that 
- \ government deficits a're modeled. First, since foreign capital flows represent ~n important 
additional source of funds, the financial crowding-out effects induced by government deficits may 
change dramatically in an open economy framework. Second, a substantial part of government 
. deficits in the U.S. is financed by inflows of foreign capital. In turn, the inflow of foreign capital 
tends to keep the dollar overvalued. An overvalued dollar makes imports relatively cheap and 
exports relatively expensive which creates further problems in terms of the trade balance. 
The introduction in the DAGEM of a foreign sector as in Ballard-Fullerton-Shoven-Whalley 
(1985) does not pose any conceptual problem. However, the interesting aspects that would 
represent a substantial improvement are the modeling of trade imbalances and international capital 
flows in a dynamic framework. Modeling trade imbalances and international capital-flows_in a 
dynamic framework are areas wide' open for research. 
: 
t 
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4.3 PIRECTIONS OF FUTUR-F.-RESEABCH 
Modeling efforts . 
This paper should be seen as a first step in the process of setting up and implementing an 

advanced, yet realistic, dynamic CGE model of the U.S. economy. In this sense: Section 4.2 provides 

an agenda for future research. f:fforts are currently being develope~ in' the direction of integrating, 

into the DAGEM a foreign sector with both commodity and capita.1 international flows. In addition, 

the disaggregation of the investment industry and in. particular, the intr.odution of housing capital 

and services is being considered. 

eolicy Applications 

. / 

The DAGEM .is flexible enough to support varied modeling generalizations./ /That being the case 
~ ! 
the ',DAGEM model is equally flexible -enough to support the analysis of different public finance 
- • to \ • 
issues. 
The DA~EM was originaly used to study the integration of the corporale and personal incom.,e, 

taxes in the' U.S. (see Pereira (1988)}. Simulation results suggest first that the net welf~ire gains' 

from integration are at best very modest and frequently negative. Such a dramatic change in tax 

codes, such as the comple~e elimination of the corporate tax and its replacement by increased 

personal income tax rates, is simulated to yield long-run benefits which are never larger than 

, .17% of the present value of future consumption and leisure. This is between four-times and 
. ' twelve-times lower than comparable results available in the literature. Secondly, it takes time 
for the efficiency gains of integration to appear. In particular. the average long-run gains are 
. more than three times as large as the average short-run gains. This new intertemporal pattern of 
efficiency effects is due to the existence of costs of adjustment. and reflects an adjustment lag in the 
interindustry investment decisions. Thirdly, partial integration, achieved by excluding dividends 
from the corporate tax base, systematically generates negative effects. This is a new second-best 
. ! 
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-effect suggesting that less than complete integration may have perv.erse efficiency effects. 
Fourthly, unlike results in previous studies, -integration is shown not to be a Pareto improvem~nt 
action. In terms of the value of current consumption and leisure, the lowest income groups are 
worse off after the policy implementation. However, all income classes show an increase in wealth 
.. . ,. 
accumulation and, ther.efore, the potential is there ·for welfare gains at sor:ne point in the future. 
Fifthly, un~er the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the effects of integration show the same patterns and 
characteristics as under the old tax regime. However, under the new tax law the efficiency gains of 
integr~tion are much lower. This suggests that the change in tax regimes in itself improved 
efficiency. In particular, the .efficiency gains from both the new tax treatment of capital gains and 
depreciation. allowances and the elimination of the investment tax credits dominate the additional 
. distortions generated by an increase in the effective corporate income tax rates. 
,;I 
The results of the simulation experiments confirm the cruci~1 impoJ.tance of the marginal 
. . / 
/~(jistortions in the labor-leisure decisions induced by the tax replacement mechanisms: the higher 
, . 
the marginal increases in the personal income tax rates the lower the efficiency gains from 
integration. In addition, the importance of marginal financial crowding out is illustrated: higher 
- ,government deficits are-associated with lower integration benefits. The importance' of the rules of 
formation of expectations should be stressed. Different rules for formation of expectations and 
even different parametrization of the same rule lead to clear changes in the effects of the policies 
considered. Finally, the simulation results are very robust to different specifications of the 
debt-equity and dividend-retention parameters as was expected given the deterministic context of 
the model. 
There are several other policy issues which the DAGEM model is particularly adequate to 
address. The following are currently under investigation. The first issue deals with the efficien~ 
effects of deficit reduction mechanisms. The imposition of an upper bound on government deficits 
and the eventual elimination of such deficits was consecrated in the Gramm-Rudman-Holling~Bill. 
For fixed tax revenues, a deficit reduction will depress government expenditures. On the other 
.... 

oJ. 
I 
74 1 
hand, a tax-financed deficit redqction will potentially depr.ess private expenditures. _ However, both 
Ithe resource and financial crowding-out effects upon the private sector of government expenditures . 
will be alleviated by the process of deficit reduction. Thus, t~e net effici.ency effect of a deficit 
I
reduction mechanism is a matter to be determined empirJcally. 
A related problem is the time frame of the elimination of government deficit's. What is the time 
fram'e that minimizes the negative effects or maximizes the PQsitive effects of the deficit. 
elimination? Also, the permanent accumulation of new debt .is widely perceived as having
. . 
undesirable effects on the economy by raising interes~ rates. . ~owever t yearly balanced budgets 
may bring forth a lack of flexibility which is equally undesirable. Are yearly balanced budgets 
really a good idea? What is the optimal planning horizon for the government to balance revenues 
and e,xpenditures? 
./" IThe second policy issue under study is the role of investment tax credits and in particular 
\ ! Iwhether investment tax credits should bli} reintroduced. Not long after the Tax Refoim Act of 1986 
- \ . 
was approved, the idea of re-introducing an ITC' was thrown into the political ar.,ena. The 
,re-introduction, of an investment tax credit has been suggested as a way of lowering Hie price of new I 
investment goods, thereby promoting investment and economic growth. The analysis of current I I
economic conditions in the U.S. gives some creclibility to the idea. The global impact of the Tax 
. f 
Reform on the economic gr0w:th is to a large extent dependent on incentives to save. Less favorable 
treatment of Individual Retirement Accounts for example, may suggest lower savings and a slower 
, economic growth. Now, in the absence of any deficit reduction mechanisms, relatively high 
. interest rates and the financial crowding-out effects generated by large government deficits may 
further depress investment demand. On the other hand, deficit reduction mechanisms of the 
"-Gramm-Rudman-Hollings type may alleviate the upward pressure upon interest rates. However. 
they are also likely to ultimately induce a drastic reduction of government spending and/or increase 
in the tax rates, and thereby create further- depressive effects in the economy. 
Considering all factors. it, is possible that at some point in the near future undesirable forces 
! 
, I 
i 
I 
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against economic growth will be unleashed. If such a scenario becomes reality, it is only natural 
that the po~sibility of re-instating an investment tax credit should ,be. r,!ised. Wouldn't it be a ~ood 
measure to counteract the potential regressive effects on investment and economic ,growth of the 
c,urrent ~ax law in the context of a high deficit economy? Furthermore, if it is a good idea to 
re-introduce an investment tax credit, what would be the'sectorial investm.ent tax credit rates that 
maximize efficiency gains and economic growth? 
,/' 
/ 
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APPE~DIX I 
DAGEM· NOIA.T!ON 
1. General Notation 
Iirrl.e. 
current time 

terminal time 

future time 

.Agents· 

consumers 

producers of consumption goods 

producers of physical capital 

government 

Commodities 

consumption of good j by i 

labor supplied by i 

leisure of i 

total available time of i 

consumption good j 

value added by j 

total investment cost by j 

adjustment costs 

use of input f by j 

capital stock. in sector j 

investment by industry j 

total demand for investment by j 

labor used by industry j 

investment good' 

use of good j by 9 

capital stock demanded by 9 . 

investment by 9 

labor demanded by 9 

Financial Flows and Assets 

wealth of i 

savings of i 

j-th industry bonds owned by i 

j-th industry equity 'owned by j 

diviqends from j received by i 

z 
T (finite) 

zstsT 

group i= 1 , ... ,e 
industry j=1,... ,J 
industry j=1 
g 
Yijt 

Lit 

H'1t 
 /'
L '/ 
Y"IJ 
~ 
. 
VAjt 
TO jt 

e j(.) 

Yjft 

Kjt 

I j t 

Ijt+ C j(.) 

Ljt 

It 

Yjgt 

Kgt 

(gt 
, Lgt 
Wit 
Sit=Fit 

B ijt 

E ijt 

Div"tIJ 
I 

. 
Ii 
I 

I 

I 

I 

I 
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government bonds owned by'i 
i's share of the market portfolio 
share of debt in its portfolio 
share of equity j ini's portfolio 
j-th's net cash flow 
j-th's gross/quasi profits 
j-th industry bonds 
j-th industry capital equity 
sector j liabilities 
dividends distributed by j 
tetained earnings by j 
new funds demanded by j 
government bonds 
government liabilities 
new funds demanded by g 
labor tax revenue 
corporate tax 
investment tax credit 
income tax 
sales tax 
.total taxes 
transfers 
prices 

. consumption good j 

vector of consumption goods 

physical investment 

labor 

interest rate 

price of equity j 

Optimal demands are referred to by superscript 
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Bigt 
Sit" 
1'-1:-e'tJ J 
e·Jt . 
~CFjt 
• Jn't 
Bjt 
Ejt 
FL'
. J t 
Oivjt 
REjt 
Fjt 
Bgt 
LGt . 
Fgt 
LTt ICTt 
ITCt~ 
rrt I/STt 
TTt 

Trt 
Pjt 
Pt 

Pit 

PLt 

rt 
PjEt 
D. Optima! supplies are referred to by 
superscript S. Predetermined stock: variables at z are denoted by a superscript * and do not have 
time subscript. Future expected prices are referred to by superscript e. 
2. Structural parameters 
preference and Techn%oy Parameters 
group i's discount rate 
Cobb-Douglas }-th share 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
. I 
I 
ai 
I 
a ij I 
1-Lja ij I 
I 
\ 
Leontiff parameters 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
Cobb-Douglas capital share 
adjustment costs parameter 
j-th's capital depreciation ~ate 
dividend/retention parameter 
new debVequity paramenter 
government discount rate 
Cobb-Douglas labor share 
Cobb-Douglas capital share 
CobtrDouglas j-th good share 
g's capital depreciation rate 
Tax parameters 
income tax rate 
income tax rate intercept 
capital gains tax 
transfers received by i 
sales tax rate 
labor tax rate 
j's corporate tax rate 
j'S investment tax credit 
j's depreciation allowances-
j"s depreciation -for tax purposes 
ajf 

aj 

1 - a j 

b·J 
 • 

0jt 

onit 
0 Ejt 
. dg. 
BgL' 
8gK 
agj 

0 gt 

Tit 

bit 

CGTit 
Tr-t "'" I / 
TH;/ 
TLt 

Tcjt 

ITCjt 

DA'
, j t 
o jt 
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APPEtjDIX II 
DAGEM - DERIVATION OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIQRAL FUNCTiONS 
The optimal dynamic problem for the i-th household is described in (7)-(11) in Section 2.3. 
In -turn, first-order necessary conditions are reported in (14)-(19) of the same section. Closed 
'. . 
-form solutions to the household problem can obtainf?d in several steps as follows. 
Step 1: Finds the solution to the adjoint difference eQuation for the marginal utility of wealth 
parametric on its initial value, qiz. 
/ 
/ 
! 
/Step 2: Finds the solution to th~eQuation of mot jon for wealth. I 

+T r it-1:j (1 + T j t) Pj t y i j t] I nz S sst [1 + ( 1 -Tit) [ ( 1 -1:j e j s) r s + 1: j e it(D i v j sIp j E s - 1 E j s) ] ] } I 
~ 
J 
Step 3: Gets Quasi closed-form solutions from the yariational conditions parametric on qiz by 
-j 
I
using the solution to the adjoint equation as in Step 1. 
·1 
I 

nz S sst [1 + ( 1 -Tis) [ ( 1 -L j e j s ) r s + L j e j s ( 0 i v j slPj E s -1. E j s ) 1]}I [q iz ( 1 + T j t) p j t] 
I 
(A.4) L*·-LS. ={{1-L·a··)(1+d·r(t-z)I IZ J IJ I • I 
I 
1 
I 
·1 
I 
! 
I 
\ 
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Step 4: Obtains the initial shadow price by pluggif!g the variatiGAal conditions as in Step 3 
* into the expression for the initial wealth level W i as in Step 2. 
'. 
Step 5: Obtains closed·form solutjons for the consumption demands and tabor supply by 
plugging this shadow price as in Step 4 back into the variational conditions as in Step 3. Only the 
net demands at z matter for the definition of equilibrium. Then, the inputs from household behayiQr 
to the Temporary Walrasjan EQuilibrjum are ~/ 
I 
/ 
Net Demands 
. -Ilarrumd for Consumption Good 1sj~: 
. '(A.S) yD jjZ==aij{1 +(1-Tiz)[(1-Ljejz)rz+Ljejz(DivjZ/PjEZ_1 Ejz)]}/{qiz(1 +Tjz)pjz} 
-Labor Supply: 
(A.7) 
in which the jnitial marginal utility of wealth is given by 
81 
. -Supply of New Funds: I 
(A. 9) FS izsbiz+(1.Tiz)[PLz L S iz+[(1-Ljejz)rz+Ljejz(Di~)ZiPjEz_1.EjzllW·i) + 
+Tri~+(1-CGTiz)Lj[PjEz-PjEz-1) Eiz -.LjP + T;z)PjzyOijz. 
Transitions 
-Transition EQuation for Wealth:, 
. 0 
+Triz+{1-CGTit)Lj[PjEt-PjEt_1]Eijt-Lj{1 +Tjz)pjzY ijz 
where both the jnitial yalue of wealth and the initial compositioo of wealth are predetermined and 
, ; 
/given by: /
\ ! 
-Transition for Wealth Composition: 
. (A.13) Bigz+1=siz+1Bigtz+1 
82 
APPENDIX III 
. . 
DAGEM - PERIVATION OF PROPUCERS BEHAVIORAL fUNCTIONS 
The optimal dynamic problem for the j-th producer is described io (28}-(32) of, Section 2.4 
. . 
In turn, first-order, necessary conditions are reported in (35}-(40) of the same section. 
Closed-form solutions to the producer problem can obtained in sev.eral steps as follows. 
Step 1: Finds the solution to the state eQuation of IDotjon for capital. 
(A. 1 ) K jt=1 jt-l + L zssst-2 Ijs[n s+ 1shst-1 (1-0jh )l+Kjzn zssst-1 (1-0js)
. . 
. Step 2: Incorporates the yariational condition for labor into the adjoint difference eQuation 
/ 

.\ / 

'(A.2) (Ljt/Kjt}={l(l +TLt}PLtl~aj['pjt-Lf(ajfPft}n1/(ar 1). 
" , 

( A • 3 ) q it= ( 1 • 0 j t) ( 1 + r t + 1 ) - 1 q j t + 1 + ( 1 -Tcj t ) ( 1"· a j) lpj t -L f ( a j f p f t) ). 

«((1 + TLt)PLtl/aj[Pjt-Lf(ajfPft))}aj/(ar1} 

Stas;La: Solyes the adjoint difference eQuation using the final adjoint condition. 
(A.5) Ajh=(1.0jh)(1+rh+1 r 1 
, (A.6) Cjs= (1 -T cjs }[Pjs -Lt< ajtp fs)]( 1-aj} {[( 1 + T Ls) PLsJ/aj[Pjs -Lf( ajtPts)]}a l(ar 1 } 
Step 4: Solves the yariational conditions for investment and labor 
(A.7) IDjt=[l/bj]{-l+[(l+rt+l)·lqjt+l/(l-fTCjt)~lt]} 
''1' 
\ 
where qjt+1 is given as in Step 3. 
83 
 I 
. . 
• where Kjt is given' as in Step 1 and optimal investment"is (A.7). 
-
. Also, the optimal supply of good j at t can be ~btained by usi~g the value added pro~uction 
function and the optimal labor demand (A.8). 

. . 

(A.9) Y~jt==Kjt{[(1 +iLt)PLtl/aj[Pjt-l:f(ajfPtt)]}a/<ar1) 

where Kjt is given as in ?tep 1 and optimal investment is (A.7). 

Only the z-period net demands matter for the definition of equilibrium. Then the inputs from 

- producer's behavior to the Temporary Walrasjan EQuilibrium are 
/ 
/ 
/Net Demands 

-Total Inyestment Demand: 

(A.10) ITDjz=IDjz+.Sbj(lDjz}2, where 
(A.11 ) I0 j z = [ 1·1 b j] { - 1 + ( 1 + r z + 1 ) - 1 q j ~+ 11 (1 -I T C j z)PIzI } 
(A.12) qjz+1=LZ+1 SSST[I1z+ 1 <h<s-1 Ajh]CjS 
(A.13) Ajh=(1-0j~)(1+rh+1r1 
(A.14) C js={1-T Cjs)[PjS-!f~ajfPfS)](1-aj){[(1 + TLS)PLsJlaj[PjS-Lf(ajfPfS)]}aj/(ar 1) 
-Labor Demand: 
-Supply of Good j: 
\ 
~ ,-.""'-,~.'...... ".-. 
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-Demand for Intermediate Inputs for all f=1,... ,J +: 
.. ·Demand for External Funds: 
I nfer-agent transfers 

·Dividends to be distributed to consumers: 

Transitjons 
, I 
,·State variable Transitioll: 
" \ 
·Liability Transitions: 	 Q
i 
. '(A.21) eSjZ+1=e·j+(1-0Ejz}FDjZ 
-
I
. 
(A.22) PjEZESjZ+1 =PjEz-1 E*j+0Ej1. FDjZ 
(A.23) 	 FL SjZ+1 =SSjZ;1 + PjEzESjZ+1 

* •• • 

In the above, FL jt K j' e j and E j are predetermined variables. 
, In turn, RE is given byJz 
I 

I 

I 
-I 
I 

, 
I 
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APPENpIX.IV 
DAGEM - PERIVATION OF GOVERNMENT BEHAVIORAl. FUNCTIONS 
The .. optimal dynamic problem for the government is described in (53)-(60) in Section 2.5 . 
. In turn, first-order necessary conditions are reported in (64)-(74) of the same section. 
Closed-form sQlutions to the· government optimization problem .can obtained in several steps -as 
follows. 
Step 1: Solyes the adjoint difference egyation for the marginal utility of public debt 
-parametrically on qiz. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
.~' \ . 

Step 2: Solyes difference eQuation for state varjable pyblic debt. 
 I 
! 
(A.l ) 
I 
I 
! 
.\ 
Step 3: Obtains Quasi closed·form solutions for the demands for labor and commoditjes from 
the variational conditions and the marginal utility of public debt as in Step 1 parametrically on qiz. 
86 
Step 4: Obtains Quasi closed-form solutiOn for investment demand .pC!rametrically on qiz,from, 
the variational condition for investment, the equation of motion for capital, and the 'adjoint equation 
for the marginal utility of capital. 
,. 	 . 
< (A. 7) 	 10 9 t = [ a 9 k / q 9 t] {[,( p It - (1 + r t + 1 r 1 ( 1 - '" 9 t + 1 ) Pit+ 1 )( 1+d g ) ( 1'+ r tr 1r 1 

.. ( 1 .. '" 9 t ) [p It _1 - ( 1 +r t) - 1 (1 - '" 9 t ) Pit] - 1 } 

Step 5: Obtains the initial shadow price of Qoyernment liabilities qgz by plugging the quasi 
closed-form solutions for the several demands into the solution to difference equation for state 
variable public debt as in Step 2. 
~A • 8 ) qg z ;Ill - { ( 1 -akg) [1 + 1 / (1 +d9 ) T .. z ] +1:z + 1 S ts T .. 1 (1 +Dg) •(t·z)! / ,/ 
.. [a k-9 PIT -1 / (1 +ag)T - zU(>1 + ~T ) / [( 1.+ rT )PIT -1 .. ( 1 .. 0 9 T ) PIT1l}! 
Step 6: Plug this shadow price qgz into quasi .Clos~d-form solutions for the several demands as 
in Steps 3 and 4 to get the qesired closed-form solution for consumption, investment. and labor 
demands. Only the net demands at z matter for the definition of equHibrium. Then, the inputs from 
. , government behavior for the Temporary \Valrasjan EQuilibrium are as follows. 
Net Demands 

·Demand for Labor: 

I 

I 
! 
I 
J j 
~""r' 
87 
\ 
·Demand for Consumption good j=1 ... J: 
-Investment Demand: 
* 
-(1-0gz)K z· 

-Demand for New Funds: 

(A.12) FD gz=rzLG *+ Trz+LjPjzyD gjz+(1 + T 9Lz)PLzLD gZ+PlziDgz-TT z 
Transitions 
-transition eQuatjon for capital stock: 
,/ 
/ 
/ 
-transition eQuation for liabilities:, 
\ 
ill ill 
, _ \ where LG and K 9 are- predetermined. 
In tum, qgz is given by 
. (A.15) qgz ={( 1-~kg)[1 + 1 I( 1 "'dg ) T -z]+ L z+-1 stsT-1 (1 +dg r(t-zL 
- [ak 9 PIT -1 1(1 +ag) T - z1[( 1 + rT )I[ ( 1 + rT ) P,T -1 - ( 1 - 0 9 T ) PIT lUI 
where ITt is given by 
\ 
~,~"~-,,,,,,~_,,,,,_.~.,,,,.~,, ....,~N', ,~.;.,_,_~~~~ .....__...... " ......., "._,~_~001 .."':;""~"".,~,-..,~.t,,,_._,,,.,,__,,,-,,,,,,,,.,-·. 
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,CA.19) ITCt~I.jTCjtPIt[ljt+Cj(ljt)] 
- fA.20) STt=Li[I.jTjtPjtyDjjt); 

, ( A • 21) ITt" I. i { b i+ Tit [ P L t L 0 Ii+ [( 1 -I.jej t) rt + I. j ejt ( 0 iVjt' Ej t) .]'N it]}· . . 

(A.22) C GT.t-I. iCGT it(PjEt-PjEt-1) Eijt~ I.jCG T jt(PjEt-PjEt-1) Ejto 

and Trt is given by 

./' 
./ 
/ 
..... \ 
"1 
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APPENDIX V 

DAGEM - EQUILIBRIUM CONDIT10NS ANDTBANS1TIONS 

1·. 	 Eguilibrium Conditions 
-Consumption Goods Markets: for j=1 , ... J: 
(A.1) L jY 0 ijt(Pt;P *t;¥j) +Y 0 Ijt(Pt;P* t;¥ I) +Y 0 jgt(Pt;P *i;¥g) + 
+L 1sfsJY 0 fjt(Pt;P *t;¥f)=Y S jt(Pt;P*t;¥j) . '. 
(A.2) yS jt=K*j{[(1 +TLt)PLt]/Sj[Pjt-Lf(SjfPft)]}Sj/(Sr1) 
(A.3) yO jft-SjfK*j{[(1 +TLt)PLt]/aj[Pjt-Lf(ajfPft)]}Sj/(ar1) 
(A.4) . y OIfe:: a IfK*I{[ (1 +TLt) PLt]lal[PIt-Lfta IfP ft)]}a I/(SI- 1 ) 
,/ 
/ 
/ 
-Labor Market: 
0 	
j 
I(A.7) L jL jt(Pt;P *t;¥j)+ L 0 It(Pt;P * t;¥ I) + L 0 gt(Pt;P*t;¥g) =LiLS it(Pt;P* t;¥ i) 
(A.8) LDjt- K *j{[(1 +TLt)PLt]/aj[Pjt- L f(ajfPft)]}1/(ar 1 ) 
I 
! 
(A.9) L 0 It= K *I{[ (1 + T Lt) PLt]/SI [p It-Lf(aIfPft)]} 1/(al-1 ) I 
I 
I 
I 
* 	 S(A.11) L r L it= 	 I 
I 
\ 
.L 
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-Inyestment Good Market: 
(A.12) L jlTO jt(Pt;P *t;¥j) + ITO It(Pt;P* t;¥ I) +1 °gt(Pt;P* t;¥g )=15 t(Pt;P * t;¥ j} 
(A.13) fTO jt=1 °j~+.5bj(10 jt)2 
'(A.14) 10 jt=[1/bj ]{(1 +r t+1)",1 Qjt+1-(1-ITC jt)PIt]} 
(A.15) ITO It-I 0 It+ .5b l(10 It) 
(A. 16) 10 1 t= [1 I b I] { ( 1 + r t + 1 ) - 1 Q I t + 1 - ( 1 -I,T Cit.) Pit] } 
(A.17) 10 gt~ 
ag k / {Qgt[PIt-(1 +rt+1)"'1 (1-0gt +1)PIt+1](1 +ag)(1 +rtr11-(1-0gt)K*t· 
/ 
.I 
,/ 
.:Fjnancial Market: 
. (A.19) L jF 0 jt(Pt;P*t;"j) + F 0 It(Pt;P*t;¥ I) +FO gt(Pt;P*t;lIg } - LiES it(Pt;P * t;¥ j} 
,<A.20) f'S it- b it+ (1 - T it)[PLt L5 it+ [( 1-Lje jt)rt+ L je jt( Divji/PjEt_1 E jt))w· j] + 
+Trit+(1-CGTit)Lj[PjEt-PjEt_1 ]E.it-Lj(1 +Tjt)PjtYO ijt 
2. Transitions 
-Capital Stock 
91 
o 0 * (A.26) K gt+1 =1 gt+(1-0gt)K 9 
-Liabilities: 
(A.27) 	 B S jt+1=B *j+(1-0Ejt)FDjt 
S * 0(A.28) PIEt 	E jt+1- PIEt-1 E j+0EjtF jt 
(A.29) FLSjt+1_BSjt+1+PjEtESjt+1 
(A.30) BS 1t+1 -B*1+(1.;0Elt)F°It 
/ 
-Total Wealth and Composition: 
(A.34) W D _it+1­
• W *j+bit+(1- Tit)[PLtLS it+[(1-Ijejt)rt+ I jejt(Divjt/P jEt_1 Ejt)]W*j]' . 
+ Trit+( 1-CGTit)Ij[PjEt-PjEt-1 ]Eijt-Ij( 1 + Tjt)pjtyD jit 
(A.3 7). B igt+1=sit+1 Bigtt+1 
92 
. 

· 3. Specification of the Shadow Prices 
-qit is given by 
. . 	 .. 
{W t+ LtssST{[biS+ Tris+( 1-T is)PLsL j+ (1-CGTis)Lj[P.j Es-Pj Es-1] Eijs]l 
-qjt+ 1 is given by 
(A.41) qjt+-1 =Lt+1 +SsST[nt+ 1 <h<s-1 Ajh]Cjs 
. !A.43) C js· (1 -Tcjs)[Pjs':E f{ a jfP fs)]( 1-aj){(1 +T Ls) PL::/aj[Pjs- rJt~fPfS)]}aI'{ ar 1 ) 
I 
~qgt 	is given by 
~ . 
". [ak g PIT-1' (1 +dg ) T -t][ (1 +rT )/[ (1 + rT) PI T -1 - (1 .. 0 jT) PIT l]}' 
4.. 	 Inter-Agent Transfers : 
-R Ejt, Divjt are given by 
(A.45) R E jt="njt< 1 -T cjt){[Pjt- Lf< ajfPft) ]yS jt- (1 + T Lt}PLtL Djt} 
'(A.46) 	Divjt=(1- 0 njt)(1-TCjt){[Pjt-Lf(ajfPtt)]ySjt-<.1 +TLt)PLtLDjt} 
-TTtf Trt are given by 
93 
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. . 
S'D.(A.49) CTt=LjTCjt[(Pjt-LfafjtPft)Y jt-(1+T Lt)PLtL' jt-rtBjt)+ 
+ T clt[(P.It-Lfa IfPft} IS t- (1 + T Lt)PLtL 0 It-rtB Itl 
. 
(A.50) ITCt=L ITCjtPlt[IO jt+ C j(IO jt})+ITC ItP It[IO It+C1(IO It) I 
,(~.51) STt=Lj[LjTjtPjtyOijt];' 
(A-.52) IT t= L i{ bit+ T it[P LtL 0 ti+ [( 1-!je jt)rt+ L je jt{ Civjt/Pj Et.. 1 E jt») Wit]} 
/ 
/ 
.\ 
I 
/ 
\ 
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APPENDIX VI 

DAGEM - DERIVATION OF GOVERNMENT DUAL BEHAVIORAL FUNCTIONS 

The problem of minimjzation of government discretionary expenditure is described' in (113)­
I • 
(119) of Sectipn 3.2. In turn, first-order necessary conditions are reported in (121)- (130) of 
the same section. Closed-form solytjons to this problem can be obtained in several steps as follows. 
Step 1: 0qtajns the solutjon to the adjoint difference egyation for the marginal cost of utility 
parametriC on its initial value qgz • 
.\ 
Step 2: Obtains the solution to the' eguation of motion for the state yariable cumulative utility: 
Step 3: Get~ Qyasi·Closed form solutions from the yariational. conditions parametrically on qgz 
by usi 19 the solution to the adjoint equation as in Step 1. 
(A.3) ygjt=a gj(1 +dgr(t-Z)n Z+1ss::a(1 +rs)qgz/pjt 
(A.4) Lgt=ag L(1 +Ogr(t-Z)n z+ 1 ssst(1 +rs)qgz/PLt 
Step 4: Obtains a Quasi-closed form solution for the optimal capital stock parametrically on 
the initial shadow price from the variational condition for investment stock owned by the 
government and the adjoint equation for the marginal cost of capital. 
95 
\ 
Step 5: Obtains the initial shadow price of public cumulative utility qgz by plugging the 
variational conditions and Kgt into the expression for the solution of the e~uation of motion for 
. 
, cumulative utility as in Step 2. 
-(1-ag k}-L.Z+1 stsr(1 +agr(!-Z) 

. [Ln(nz+1 ssst(1 +re s)(1 +agr(t-Z»+L.jagj(LnagrLnpejt} + 

/ 
/ 
.\ / 
Step 8: Plug the initial shadow price qgz as· in step 5 into ~he quasi closed-form solutions as in 
. , 
Steps 3 and 4 to get the desired closed-form solution for the comoensated demand functions. In 
'particular at z'the demand functions are: 
ag L(LnagL -Lnpe Lt)+agK(LnagK- Ln(( 1 +ret)pe lt_1-pe It( 1-0gt)»]}I 
[L.zstsr(1 +agr(t-Z»)} 
(A.8) 	 L d gz=[agj/PLz)' exp{{F*z· L.zstsr(1 +agr(t-Z). 
[Ln(TIz+1Ssst(1 +res)(1 +agr(t-Z}}+L.jagj(LnagrLnpejt) + 
96 

ag L:( LnagL-Lnpe Lt)+ agK (Ln agK- Ln( (1 +ret) pe It-1-P~ It-( 1:0gt)) )]}I 
[Lzst:ST( 1+dg r(t-Z)]} 
'0 l'(A.9) 1 gz-{[agK(l +rz+1 )(l+dgr ]/[(1+rz+1 )PIZ·Plz+1 (1-0gZ+1)]) 
(Ln(nz+1ssst(l +reS)(l +dgr(t-Z))+Ljagj(Lnagr.L.np9jt) + 
agL(LnagL_Lnp9Lt!+agK(LnagK- Ln«1-+r9t)p9 Ir.1-p91t(-1-0~t) ))1J1 
(IzstST( 1 +dg r(t-Z)]}_( 1-0gZ )K *9 
,/ 
/ 
! 
f • 
----, 
\ 
,,;..,__'''' ... -..-............. ,.,. _.. 4»,,~,~.. ...-"..,.___ ,'... ~*.~_."OE'"'-_~u••; ..... ·~.~.,.,._,~........."'... ............-,~...:--.-~-.""'''.''''',--...-----....;..".'-'""'" ..-,•.- .._,.... ,. 
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APPENDIX VII 

DAGEM ~ PERIVATION OF HOUSEHOLD QUAL BEHAVIORAL FUNCTIONS 

The problem of minimization of household expenaiture necessarY to finance a certain utility 
. 
,path is described in (141 )-(145) of Section 3.3. In turn. first-order necessary conditions are 
reported in (147)-(152) of the same section. Closed-form solution to this problem can be 
obtained in several steps as follows. 
Step 1:' Obtains the solution to the adjoint difference equation for the shadow price of utility 
. parametric on the initial value qiz : 
/ 
/ 
.\ / 
~, \ 
Step %: Obtains the solution to equation of motion for the state yariable utility: 
Step 3: Gets quasi closed-form solutions from the yariatiOnal condjtjons parametric on qiz by 
using the solution to the a,djoint equation as in Step 1. 
(A.3) Yijt- a ij(1 +djr(t-Z)n Z + 1ssst(1 +rs)qiz/ (1 +Tjt)pjt 
(A. 4 ) ( L *r Lit) = ( 1 - ! j a ij)( 1 + d ir (t -z) n. z + 1 S sst ( 1 + r s ) q izl ( 1 -Tit) p L t 
Step 4: Obtains the initial shadow price of utility by plugging the variational conditions as in 
Step 3 into the expression for the initial felicity as in Step 2. 
""r"' 
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[L.j a ijLn[ail(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1-L.jaij)Ln[(1-L.jaij)/(1-Tit)PLtl + 
Ln[(1 +djr(t-Z)n Z+1 ssst(1 +rs )]]}/[L.zS·tsT(1 +dir(t~i)]}. 
Step 5: Plug the initial shadow price as in Step 4 into the vari.ational conditions as in Step 3 to 
g~t the desired closed-form solution tor the compensated demand functions. 
(A.S) 	 ydijt=[ajj( 1+dj)-(t:Z)n Z+ 1 ssst(1 +rs)/(1 +Tjt)Pjt] 

8Xp{ {F*r L.zstST( 1+djr(t-Z). 

[L.j a ijLn[ajj/(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1:L.ja ij)Ln[(1-L.ja ij)/(1-T it)PLt] + , 
/ 
. , 	 / 
.\ 	 Ln[(1 +djr(t-Z)n Z+1 ssst(1 +rs )]]}/[L. stsT(1 +djr(t-Z)llz
. ., \ 

0
(A.7) 	 L ~ r L it- [a i j ( 1 + d jr(t -z) n Z + 1 S sst ( 1 + r s.>1(1 .. T j t) P L t}. 

QXp{{ F* i -L.zstsT( 1+djr(t-z). 

[L.j a ijLn[ai/(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1-L.jaij)Ln[(1-L.jaij)/(1-Tit)PLt] + 
Ln[ (1 +djr(t-Z)n z+ 1ssst( 1+rs)]]}/[L.zstST( 1+dir(t-z)n 
and in particular for time z: 
[L.j a ijLn[ail(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1-L.ja ij)l.n[(1-L.jajj)/(1-T it)PLt] + 
Ln [( 1+djr(t-z) n z+ 1ssst (1 + r s)]]}/[L.zstsT (1 +d ir(t-Z)]} 
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[Lja ijLn[a ij/(1 +Tjt)Pjt]+(1-.:r.jaij)Ln[(1-:r.jaij)/(~ -Tit)PLt] + 
L n [ ( 1 + ai) - ( t -z ) n z + 1 S sst ( 1 + r ~ ) ] I} / [:r.z s tST'( 1 + ai} • ( t·z) ] } 
/ 
/
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APPEr9DI« VII! 
DAGEM - POLICY EVALUATION INDICATORS 
:Aggregate Short-Ryn Indicators: 
(A.1 ~ AS REV f==Lj{ exp[(Frit-Fbi~)/LtsSST( 1 +a jr(S-t)1-1 }SRC Fb it 
(A.2) AS R C V t=Li{1-exp[Frit-Fbit)lLtsss~(1 +Oir(S-t)nSRCFrit 
, -Aggregate Long-Run Indicators: 
,,/ 
/ 
.I 
-
, i
, r ..(A.4) ALRC V t=LtssST[I1t+ 1 Shss(1 +r h)]ASRCV s 
-. \ -Indivjdual Short-Run Expenditure Fypctions: 
. [ L ja ij Ln [ a ii' (1 + T j s ) P j s'] + ( 1 -L ja ij) Ln [ ( 1 -L ja ij) I ( 1 -Tis) PLsI + 
+Ln [( 1+o;r (s-t) n t+1 S h SS (1 +r h) ]]}I[LtssST(1 +0 ir (s-t) I} 
\ 
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FOOTNOTES 
1 I '. 
CGE models have been exten'sively used in other areas of economics. See Shoven-Whalley 
(1984) for a s'urvey of international trade applications, Decaluwe-Martens (1985) and Robinson 
{1986} for applications in the area of development, James (1985) fo~ 'a' survey of economic 
histoFY applications, and A. Manne (1985) ·and Borges (1986) for all encompassing surveys. 
21 
Two models somewhat similar to DAGEM were developed simultaneously with this dissertation 
by Goulder-Summers (1987) and Auerbach-Kotlikoff (1987). While the treatment of 
-government deficits, financial markets, and expectations remains unique to DAGEM, the modeling of 
consumer and producer behavior is essentially the same in the three models-/ 
/ 
/31 
~ \ 
Common 'expectations are a convenient assumption. However, since expectations are in general 
. not self-fulfilling, common expect~tions are not necessary for the existence of equilibrium (see 
. ,Radner( 1972)}. 
41 
It has been pointed out in the literature on theoretical general equilibrium that such a 
hypothesis, even though widely assumed, is internally inconsistent. In fact, it is impossible to 
have a finite number of individually negligible agents. For incflYiduaJs to be negligible we need a 
continuum of agents (see Aumann (1964) on this issue). A possible compromise not pursued here 
. 

would be to. consider a finite number of agent types, each including a continuum of agents. 

51 
It should be emphasized that equilibrium is not defined in terms of action plans, current prices, 
and price expectations such that all markets current and future are cleared, as would be the -case 
with a rational expectations equilibrium concept. (See Radner (1983) for a survey of general. 
102 

equilibrium models under uncertainty.) 
61 
These ass'umptions are sufficient for existence. and uniqueness of optimal'intertemporal output 
. . 
plans even with constant returns to scale technologies ('See Pereira (1986, 1987) on this issue). 
7 I . 
In this model, the government decides on the optimal intertemporal" spending structure. 
. . 
However, the tax. system is not a decision variable; it is institutionally given. This behavioral 
assumption is made for simplicity, and reflects the political rigidities associated with changing the 
tax structure as opposed to spending decisions. 
~I 
The fact that government acts in a benevolent fashion is not welfare reducing. In fact. the 
- , 
government optimization process is confined to the space of a public good whic:h
/'
only enters private 
\ .I 
I 
utilities in a strongly separable way.and is not subject to market pricing. (See Tesfatsion (1984) 
. . ." \ . 

on the inconsistency of benevolent government behavior.) 

91 
.I~ should be noted that a satisfactory rationale for the existence of dividends with the present tax 
-
"code is missing in the profession (see Shoven-Simon (1987». 
1 0/ 
The.base case with the DAGEM essentially reproduces the main relationships in the U.S. economy. 
, In particular, household behavior implies an average savings elasticity with respect to interest 
" . rate of .20. This is well within the range of values in use in the CGE liter~ture. On the o'lher hand, 
household behavior implies an average labor supply elasticity with respect to wage rate of 1.11 . 
. . This value is at the upper bounds of the set acceptable values (see Lucas-Rapping (1970». 
11/ 
Unlike Shoven-Whalley's GEMTAP model, only the strong form of yearly constant felicity is 
available in the DAGEM (see Ballard-FuHerton-Shoeven-Whalley (1985) p. 152). 
\ 
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1 21 
t 
the distinction between the decision time frame - decision horizon - and the number of 

equilibrium to be computed - equilibrium horizon - is very importan~. In fact, give~ the terminal 

conditions for economic behavior as in (11), (32), and (57), strong terminal effects should be 

. expected were the model to be run for a number of equilibria equal to the d:cision time horizon. In 

turn, such terminal effects would severely bias the evaluation analv.sis. By introducing different 

decision horizon and equilibrium horizon, the terminal effects may be virtually avoided. Still, the 

economic decisions in the equilibrium horizon satisfy .the terminal conditions for economic 

behavior as global consistency requirement~. For example, while the "government is not. 

constrained to balance revenues and expenditures over the equilibrium horizon, the intertemporal 

. balanced budget .condition is imposed over the decision horizon. The government acts as though, 

"" 

. given enough time, public debt will be 'repaid even if that is not necessar.ily the case within the 
/ 
/equilibrium horizon. 

1 31 

The simulation results are precise in the sense that they are robust to roun~off errors and are 

. ,not affeqted by the degree of accuracy in the computation of economic equilibrium. 
1 41 
The efficiency results generated by the DAGEM tend to be robust to small changes on the 
adjustment cost parameters around the original values. \Vhile this is a desirable sensitivity 

analysis result, the nature of the problem here is different. The "true" original values are not 

known with an acceptable degree of confidence. The parameter values used in the paper may be far 

, off the true values. 
, 
Notice first, that to a large extent this problem is shared by any of the other dynamic CGE models 

with adjustment costs. Second, if it is likely that with the true parameter values the quantitative 

results in this model would be somewhat different, the qualitative results would not be likely to 

change. 
I 

I 
\ 
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TABLE 1 
. . . 
CLASSIFICATION OF INDUSTRIES AND CONSUMER GROUPS IN THE DAGEM 
I

CONSUMER GROUPS 
(Households classified by $Thousands' 'of 1973 gross income) 
Group # 1 0-6 
Group # 2 6-15 i 
....Group # 3 15+ 
/' 
/ 
! 
INDUSTRIES 
Sector # 1 
Sector # 2 
Sector # 3 
Sector # 4 
Agriculture. Mining, Energy 
Food, Textiles, Paper, Chemicals, Lumber, Metals 
Trade, Finance. Real Estate, Services 
Capital: Construction. Transportation, Machinery 
--
"~ .........-.....~." ---......."""~~ ...... ,-.~,. 
\ 

TABLE.2 

BASE CASE PARAMETER VALUES AND STOCKS FOR EACH INDUSTRY 

SECTOR 1 
A.griculture 
SECTOR 2 . 
Manufacturing 
SECTOR·3 
S~rvices 
SECTOR 4· 
C.apital 
General Parameters 
Cobb-Douglas Labor Share 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 
Adjustment Cost Parameter 0.035 0.02 0.025 0.016 
Depreciation Rate 0.099 0.07 0.067 0.085 
Equity/Capital 0.84 0.78 0.35 0.81 
Retention/Earnings 0.63 0.3 0.28 0.25 
, 
Tax Parameters, 
Old Tax Law 
I 
/1' 
Corporate Tax 0.01 \ 0.46 0.3 0.45 
Investment Tax Credit 0.038 .0.04 0.013 0.039 
.Depreciation Rate (Tax) 0.203 0.13 0.124 0.128 
Labor Tax 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
\ 
Sales Tax 0.024 0.02 0.01 0 
Tax Parameters 
Current Tax Law 
Corporate Tax 
Investment. Tax Credit 
Depreciation -Rate (Tax) 
Labor Tax 
Sales Tax 
0.01 
-
0.15 
0.09 
0.024 
0.3 
-
0.9 
0.09 
0.02 
0.2 
-
0.8 
0.09 
0.01 
0.3 
. 
0.9 
0.09 
0 
Stock Values 
Capital 795 946 2509 11 0 
--
\ 
TABLE 3 
BASE CASE PARAMETER AND STOCKS FOR HOUSEHOLDS AND GOVERNMEN1 
LOW INCOME MEr) INCOME 
. 
HIGH INCOME GOVERNMENT 
General Parameters 
CD Share of Labor/Leisure 0.201 0.371 0.65 0.432 
CD Share-Sector 1 0.011 0.008 0.008 0.004 
.CD Share-Sector 2 0.226 0.203 0.19 0.169 
CD Share-Sector 3 0.562 0.418 0.452 0.062 
Discount Rate 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Population Distribution 0.38 0.41 0.21 ." .,; .. 
Wealth Shares . 0.06 0.25 0.69~ .. 
Dep.Rate of Governt Capital .. 
. 
.. -~/ 
I 0.06 
Tax Parameters 
Old Tax Law 
. , 
... 
Personal Income Tax 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Capital Gains Tax 0.05 0.05 0.05 .. 
Tax Parameters 
Current Tax Law 
Personal Income Tax 0.08 0.15 0.25 .. 
Stock Values 
Government Capital Stock 
Public Debt 
.. 
.. 
.. 
.. 
-
-
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